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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has used a credit card, taken out a mortgage or a home
equity loan, or borrowed money to purchase a car knows one simple fact
about U.S. consumer law: mandatory disclosure has become the primary
Federal mechanism for regulating the consumer credit market.' The
physical evidence can be found across the country-our desk drawers,
file cabinets, and garbage cans2 overflow with unread, prolix explana-
tions of our legal rights and contractual obligations as consumer credit
borrowers. This preference for regulating through disclosure might be
seen as either desirable public policy or evidence of pathology in the
U.S. political system.3 In either case, this regulatory approach embodies
the acceptance of a view of consumer law and credit markets influenced
by the economics of information. From this perspective, government
I See Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection,
in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 110 (Thomas A. Durkin &
Michael E. Staten, eds., 2002) (observing that "mandatory disclosure has become the main
financial consumer-protection approach in the United States at the federal government level");
Griffith L. Garwood, Robert J. Hobbs, & Fred H. Miller, Consumer Disclosure in the 1990's, 9
GA. ST. L. REV. 777, 777 (1993) (noting the pervasiveness of disclosure in consumer protec-
tion law). For several examples, see infra notes 17, 49.
Of course, there are other areas of law where the disclosure approach is utilized heavily,
most notably, securities regulation. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CiN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2000) ("Mandatory disclosure is a - if
not the - defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation."); Troy Paredes, Blinded by the
Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 417, 421 n. 11 (2003) (noting that literature on mandatory disclosure in securities law is
"voluminous" and collecting leading works on the subject); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking
the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
2 See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 233, 234 (2002) ("One need look no further than the credit cards within one's
wallet and dig up the documentation that corresponds to each credit card, either in a file or
garbage can somewhere, to discover that one has entered into a contract without knowing all
of the terms.").
3 See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit:
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 814-15 (2003)
("[C]onsumer activists complain the industry uses meaningless disclosure rules to deflect leg-
islative pressure for more substantive consumer protections such as interest rate caps and gen-
erous bankruptcy discharge provisions.") (citing Kathleen E. Keest, Whither Now? Truth in
Lending in Transition - Again, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 360, 360 (1995)); Edward L.
Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J.
233, 234-35 (1991) ("Our penchant for disclosure laws is in part a political compromise and in
part a collective neurosis, but it is also an artifact of the current methodology of statutory
design.").
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regulators are responding to a form of market failure4 that economists
refer to as an information asymmetry-a severe imbalance of informa-
tion between parties to an exchange. 5 In response to such purported mar-
ket failures, 6 the government mandates the disclosure of information to
reduce asymmetries and restore competitive balance (however defined)
to the marketplace. Thus, mandatory disclosure laws implicitly accept
the power of markets to satisfy consumer desires, while reflecting the
legislative understanding 7 that forces of many kinds may impede the effi-
cient or competitive operation of the market for a particular good. Such
solutions comport with the teachings of law and economics scholars who
long have expressed a preference for informational remedies to informa-
4 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44-47 (4th ed. 2004)
(describing four sources of market failure: monopoly and market power, externalities, public
goods, and severe informational asymmetries). Professor Viscusi explains the concept of mar-
ket failure as follows:
In idealized market situations, the unconstrained choices of consumers, coupled with
the provision of goods in the marketplace by competitive firms, lead to efficient
outcomes as consumers select the bundle of goods they most prefer. There may be,
however, many departures from the idealized world. These departures are described
as various forms of market failure, where "market failure" simply means a failure of
market transactions in the real world to live up to the idealized assumptions hypothe-
sized by economists.
W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consumer Sovereignty, 23
HARV. J. L & PUB. POLICY 211, 212 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also John 0. Ledyard,
Market Failure, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 326-29 (John
Eatwell et al. eds. 1987); Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market
Failure, 18 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 558 (1999) (criticizing the concept of
market failure).
5 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 47 ("[S]evere asymmetries can disrupt markets
so much that a social optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange."); Andrew
Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOM-
ICS 133-35 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1987).
6 Economic theory suggests that in some cases sellers will voluntarily provide the re-
quired information to buyers to gain a competitive edge in the marketplace. See Michael J.
Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with
Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 46 (2003) ("A key result in
the early literature on disclosure is that a privately informed seller will voluntarily disclose all
information that can be costlessly verified."); Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 168, 173, 194 (2002); Jeff
Sovem, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied War-
ranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof,
1993 Wis. L. REV. 13, 74 n. 245 (1993); Sherrill Shaffer, Rethinking Disclosure Requirements,
Bus. REV. 15, (May/June 1995) ("[M]andatory disclosure may be redundant, since under cer-
tain conditions firms will voluntarily and truthfully disclose all relevant information about
their financial condition or product quality.").
7 For the purposes of this discussion, I am not questioning either whether legislators
actually believe that market failures or information asymmetries exist or whether they think
that mandatory disclosure is the most appropriate remedy for such problems. For an example
of the public choice scholarship in the field, see Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of
Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587 (1995) (analyzing the regulation of coercive
collection powers of consumer lenders).
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tion asymmetries in the marketplace 8 and great suspicion of more direct
forms of consumer credit regulation, such as usury laws that set maxi-
mum interest rates. 9
A quintessential example of mandatory disclosure regulation is the
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 10 a landmark consumer law1 that com-
8 See Paul H. Rubin, Information Regulation (Including Regulation of Advertising), in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 271, 272 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000) ("[I]f one believes that there is some market failure caused by a lack of informa-
tion, then the preferred solution is to provide the missing information, rather than regulate the
market directly."); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regula-
tion of Consumer Information, 24 J. OF L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981) (arguing "where ineffi-
cient outcomes are the result of inadequate consumer information, information remedies will
usually be the preferable solution"); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, & Steven Salop, Infor-
mation Remedies for Consumer Protection, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 410, 411 (May 1981) ("Infor-
mation strategies tend to be more compatible with incentives, less rigid, and do not require
regulators to compromise diverse consumer preferences to a single standard."); id. at 413 ("In-
formation remedies are most likely to be the most effective solution to information problems.
They deal with the cause of the problem rather than with its symptoms, and leave the market
maximum flexibility."); Peterson, supra note 3, at 882-83 (explaining why disclosure remedies
appeal to those operating from an economically-minded perspective).
9 See Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 110 ("It is well known ... that direct
financial-market interventions like regulation of interest rates and contract terms for credit
produce their own set of problems: they reduce consumers' choices, create shortages in the
marketplace, stifle innovation, and cause other disruptions.") (citing Thomas A. Durkin, An
Economic Perspective on Interest Rate Limitations, 9 GEO. ST. L. Rv. 821 (1993)); Lynn
Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 589, 659 (2000) ("The most frequently articulated
view of usury laws from today's dominant economic perspective posits a negative role for
usury laws - they interfere with matters best left to 'The Market."'); Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1314 (2002) ("Ultimately, price controls are counterproductive. They
restrict the flow of credit, thereby hurting the very individuals they are designed to serve.");
Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 179 ("Usury laws are simply price controls and can be
predicted to have many of the same effects: queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an illegal mar-
ket, loansharking."); James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 465-66
(2000) (stating that "the economic literature ... treats the usury laws as crude and misguided
devices").
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (2003). For detailed information on the Truth in Lending
Act, see infra Part I.C.
11 See ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, TRUTH IN LENDING § 1.2.1 (4th ed.
1999) (noting that TILA was "landmark legislation" whose "enactment marked the birth of
modem consumer legislative activism"); RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN
LENDING 3 (Robert A. Cook et al., eds., 2000) (referring to TILA as "pioneering legislation");
Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 11l (stating that TILA is "arguably the most important
of the federal information protections in the financial area"); Jonathan Landers, Some Reflec-
tions on Truth in Lending, 1977 ILL. L. F. 669, 670 ("No comparable legislation had ever been
seriously considered, let alone enacted, on the federal level."); Edward L. Rubin, Legislative
Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1991)
(noting that TILA "was the first modem consumer protection statute"); Elizabeth J. Keeler,
Note, The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980: Is "Simplification" Better
for Both Consumer and Creditor, 8 NOVA L.J. 175, 183 (1983) ("The Truth in Lending Act is
considered as one of Congress' most ambitious consumer protection efforts to date.") (citing
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pels the disclosure of specified information in connection with consumer
credit transactions.' 2 More than thirty-five years after its initial pas-
sage,' 3 and almost twenty-five years after its reconstitution,' 4 TILA re-
mains one of the most important pieces of Federal consumer protection
legislation for two main reasons. First, TILA has enormously wide ap-
plication; the Act applies to nearly every consumer credit transaction in
the United States, including, inter alia, mortgages, car loans, and credit
card purchases. 15 Few Federal laws apply to such a greater number of
financial transactions. Second, TILA has significant symbolic impor-
tance because Congress explicitly chose to use disclosure, rather than
direct, substantive regulation of the market as the primary, though not
sole, mechanism for achieving TILA's various goals.' 6 TILA's influ-
ence cannot be doubted: since the Act's initial passage in 1968, wisely or
not, Congress has followed TILA's approach by attempting to resolve
many other consumer law issues by using mandatory disclosure
mechanisms. ' 7
Jonathan M. Landers & Cathleen Chandler, The Truth-in-Lending Act and Variable-Rate
Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 35, 38 (1976)).
12 See infra notes 50, 75-78, 86-92 and accompanying text.
13 See Pub. L. No. 90-321 (1968) (currently 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (2003)); see also
infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text for more on the legislative history of TILA.
14 See infra note 101.
15 See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1 1.01, at 3 (noting that TILA applies to
"virtually every form of consumer credit transaction - from home mortgages to small loans to
credit cards plans to even pawn transactions"); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Joint Report to Congress Con-
cerning Reform to the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act at I
n. 5 (1998) ("TILA governs all types of consumer credit transactions, including credit cards
and other lines of credit, unsecured installment loans, and home secured loans.") (hereinafter
"FRB/HUD Report").
16 See HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, 1 CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES
AND CREDIT REGULATION § 311, at 517 (1986) (noting that TILA "is primarily a disclosure
law" although there are a few non-disclosure aspects to the Act); Steven W. Bender, Consumer
Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1071-72 (1996) (explaining that TILA has elements of both "market
perfection" and "market control," though "[m]arket control strategies in TILA . . . usually
target isolated loan transactions and are overshadowed by TILA's typical reliance on
disclosures").
TILA's non-disclosure provisions will not be addressed in this Article. The most notable
of these provisions gives borrowers the power to rescind certain transactions in which their
homes are used as collateral. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2003); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11,
§§ 6.1-6.15, at 337-414; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 597-655; see also Beach v.
Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1998) (discussing right of rescission under TILA
for borrower whose loan is secured with his principal dwelling); Elwin Griffith, Truth in Lend-
ing: The Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount
Financed in Closed-End Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 191 (1998); Daniel J. Morgan,
The Right of Rescission, Still Controversial After All These Years, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 177 (1995).
17 See Rubin, supra note 3, at 234 (explaining that TILA "serves as the template for
virtually all subsequent legislation in the consumer credit area"). Examples of other federal
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Despite the elegance of TILA's often-emulated approach to govern-
ment regulation, the Act's disclosure model has generated significant
criticism. Most of these criticisms are instrumental in nature. 18 Critics
have questioned the efficacy of TILA's mandatory disclosure regime
based on both empirical evidence and theories regarding consumer be-
havior. Some of these critiques emphasize deficiencies in the disclosures
themselves, while others focus on the ability or likelihood of consumers
to utilize the disclosures. 19 Put bluntly, many critics simply do not think
that disclosure works. They doubt that TILA has achieved its purpose of
reducing information asymmetries and facilitating comparison-shopping
for credit, and ultimately stimulating a more competitive credit market.
Specifically, such critics point to particular problem areas within the con-
sumer credit market, such as the much-analyzed issue of predatory lend-
ing, 20 as proof of the limits of disclosure remedies. 2 l By doing so, they
seek to cast doubt on the economic model of mandatory disclosure, per-
haps without suggesting that disclosure is futile in all regulatory
contexts. 2
2
Despite the rhetorical force of the TILA criticisms, recent legislative
efforts demonstrate that there is little doubt that Congress will continue
to regulate the consumer credit market through mandatory disclosure.2 3
It makes sense, therefore, for regulators to employ normatively just and
empirically sound methods for structuring and evaluating the elements of
any mandatory disclosure regime. Socioeconomics, a critical, multidis-
ciplinary approach to legal regulation and practice 24 can help inform this
process. By empirically and theoretically questioning and refining the
neoclassical economic assumptions that underlie TILA's disclosure re-
laws with significant disclosure provisions are the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2004), the Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13 (2003), and the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-12 (2003).
18 See infra Part II.B.
19 See infra notes 102-107, 112-117 and accompanying text.
20 The literature on predatory lending has expanded greatly in the past few years. See,
e.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9; Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or
Predatory Lending? 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002); Engel & McCoy, supra note 9; Margot
Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 111 (2002); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Ex-
portation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518
(2004); Abraham B. Putney, Note, Rules, Standards, and Suitability: Finding the Correct Ap-
proach to Predatory Lending, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2101 (2003). For a recent book-length
treatment of the subject, see WHY THE POOR PAY MORE: HOW TO STOP PREDATORY LENDING
(Gregory D. Squires, ed. 2004).
21 See infra Part II.B.3.
22 See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 212-217 and accompanying text.
24 See infra Part III.A.
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gime,25 socioeconomics can focus attention squarely on the efficacy of
particular disclosures and help us determine the contexts in which
mandatory disclosure is likely or unlikely to succeed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an economic model
of the consumer credit market, followed by a brief review of TILA's
history and a survey of the Federal Truth in Lending regime's primary
disclosure elements. Part II reviews and examines the instrumental criti-
ques of TILA, with emphasis on the empirical claims that TILA's
mandatory disclosure regime has not reduced information asymmetries
and achieved its credit-shopping goals. Part III first provides a basic
introduction to law and socioeconomics, and then demonstrates how the
socioeconomic approach can help us to evaluate and improve our ex-
isting method of regulating the consumer credit market through
mandatory disclosure regulatory mechanisms.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUTH IN LENDING LAW
A. THE BASIC ECONOMIC MODEL OF CONSUMER CREDIT SHOPPING
It is helpful to frame the discussion of Federal truth-in-lending law
with a basic economic model of consumer credit shopping.26 A con-
sumer who is contemplating a purchase initially must decide whether to
postpone or forgo consumption. If she goes forward with the purchase,
the consumer must choose whether to use cash, a cash equivalent, or
credit. If she chooses credit, she must determine which of the competing
types and sources of credit best suit her needs. Rational27 consumers
likely wish to borrow money for the lowest price available.28 The price
in this case equals the contract interest rate, plus any other fees or costs
associated with borrowing money, 29 and "[i]n a perfectly efficient finan-
cial market, the price of a loan is a function of its risk."' 30 If the credit
25 See infra Part ILI.B.
26 This discussion was inspired by a model elaborated in Hynes & Posner, supra note 6,
at 170-71; see also Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers'
Understanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. of PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 66,
66-67 (1999).
27 1 am equating rationality with a desire for wealth maximization here. See Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assump-
tion from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000) (stating basic assumption
that individuals seek to maximize wealth); see also Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary
Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psy-
chology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319, 321-22 (2001).
28 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imper-
fect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) ("The
competitive price is the lowest price a market can sustain, and all consumers would, other
things equal, prefer to purchase at the lowest price.").
29 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 66.
30 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 66.
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market is competitive, therefore, "the interest rate will reflect the time
value of money, inflation, and the risk of default,"'3 ' the consumer will
accept the loan if "the transformation of future wealth into current con-
sumption, exceeds the interest rate,"32 though sometimes the costs of ad-
ditional comparison-shopping 33 for the lowest interest rate may exceed
the benefits of further shopping. 34 Economists believe that consumers
require full information regarding available credit terms from competing
providers to choose rationally among sources of credit,35 and that asym-
metric information between borrowers and lenders36 is one factor37 that
may cause price inefficiency in the credit market.38
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
The basic economic model described above illuminates the history
of Federal truth-in-lending law.39 The tale begins in the decades follow-
31 Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 170.
32 Id.
33 See Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Relationships Among Information Search Ac-
tivities When Shopping for a Credit Card, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 330, 333 (Winter 2000) ("The
search costs include the opportunity cost of time (lost wages) and physical and mental efforts
spent in the search process.").
34 See Jonathan M. Landers and Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in
Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 717-721 (1979) (discussing cost-benefit analysis of additional
credit shopping); Peterson, supra note 3, at 893 (in the context of high-cost credit, arguing that
"[a]t some point shopping costs will outweigh any uncertain benefits of reduced prices which
might be gained from shopping, making it irrational for many if not most or all consumers to
do pre-transactional shopping"); William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation
in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 422 ("If the amount borrowed is not large,
often the amount to be saved by obtaining the lowest available interest rate is not sufficient to
justify the inconvenience and costs of comparative shopping.").
35 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 66 ("According to classical economic theory,
this situation [perfect competition] exists when consumers have equal access to full informa-
tion about the costs and benefits of competing loans from a variety of sellers.").
36 This Article will not address situations where it is the creditors, rather than the debt-
ors, who lack the relevant information to guarantee a competitive market, though such situa-
tions surely do exist. See Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 194; Lee & Hogarth, supra note
26, at 66; see also Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-
Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. Rav. 1561, 1566
(1995) ("Asymmetric information is inherent in credit relationships. Not only do borrowers
often know more about their own risk of default than do lenders, they can increase their riski-
ness after a loan has been made."). At least in the area of consumer finance, experts and
commentators often proceed under the assumption that consumers are less knowledgeable than
credit providers regarding the terms of the lending relationship. See Garwood, Hobbs &
Miller, supra note 1, at 780.
37 Non-informational sources of market inefficiency or failure will not be discussed here.
38 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, Information Remedies for Consumer Protection, supra
note 8, at 411 (describing deleterious effects of consumers' information problems on product
markets); Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 172-73; Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 66
(noting that complexity and variety of price and terms of credit may impair a consumers'
ability to shop effectively for credit, thus acting as a barrier to price efficiency).
39 State truth-in-lending laws are beyond the scope of this Article. For general back-
ground on such laws, see ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, §§ 273-74, at 477-80; RENUART &
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ing World War 11,4 0 when the consumer credit market in the United
States expanded greatly. 4 ' At the time, there was no uniformly accepted
measure for the cost of credit,42 thus making it difficult for consumers to
comparison shop for consumer credit or to determine, in the first in-
stance, whether the use of credit was prudent. 43 As one scholar explains:
Throughout history there has been no common terminol-
ogy used in credit contracts. After the explosion of
mainstream moderately priced consumer credit use fol-
lowing World War II, the different meanings that lenders
ascribed to terms became more noticeable than at any
other time in human history. Even the most basic con-
tractual terms such as interest rates had no commonly
shared definition. The result was that consumers neither
KEEST, supra note 11, § 2.5, at 77-79; see also Schiltz, supra note 20 (surveying state regula-
tion of consumer credit).
40 For historical accounts of the pre-WWII development of consumer credit in the United
States, see LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
CONSUMER CREDIT (1999); Peterson, supra note 3, at 845-63.
41 See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, at 475 n. 3 ("[T]he volume of consumer credit
mushroomed after World War II. Between 1950 and 1971, consumer credit outstanding rose
from $21.5 billion to $137.2 billion, a five-fold increase.") (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1972) [hereinafter "NCCF
Report"]); CALDER supra note 40, at 291-303; DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE xvi
(1967) (noting that consumer debt had grown so rapidly in the post-WWII period that the word
"explosion"-albeit a clichd describing rapid change-is a "particularly apt description" of the
changes in consumer credit trends); Peterson, supra note 3, at 864-65; see also Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973) (noting that the use of consumer
credit increased from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion from the end of World War II through 1967,
"a rate of growth more than 4 1h times as great as that of the economy") (citing H.R. REP. No.
90-1040, at 10-11 (1967)); S. REP. No. 90-392 (1967).
Note that when the National Commission on Consumer Finance released the report that
Alperin and Chase cite above, Federal Reserve Board data did not include owner-occupied
mortgages as a form of consumer credit. See NCCF Report, supra note 41, at 7. TILA does,
however, apply to mortgages in addition to other forms of consumer credit. See ROHNER &
MILLER, supra note 15, 1.01, at 3; Joseph K. Heselton, James A. McCaffrey & Fred H.
Miller, Truth in Lending Disclosure in Open and Closed End Credit, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
17, 22 (1984) (observing that TILA does not "follow the traditional industry conception of
consumer credit that excludes real estate transaction").
42 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 875-76.
43 As the Supreme Court explained, despite the enonnous growth of consumer credit in
the post-WWII period, Congressional hearings showed that:
[C]onsumers remained remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations
and of the costs of deferring payment. Because of the divergent, and at times fraud-
ulent, practices by which consumers were informed of the terms of the credit ex-
tended to them, many consumers were prevented from shopping for the best terms
available and, at times, were prompted to assume liabilities they could not meet.
Mourning, 411 U.S. at 363 (footnotes omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 90-1040, at 13 (1967); S.
REP. No. 90-392, at 1-3 (1967)); see also NCCF Report, supra note 41, at 169-70 (1972); John
M. Drain, Jr., Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 89,
90, 92-94 (1970) (addressing consumer confusion over costs of credit).
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shopped for cheap credit nor even understood how much
they were actually paying for the credit to which they
agreed.44
In light of these conditions, 45 a group of lawmakers, led by Senator
Paul Douglas of Illinois,46 mounted a zealous effort to create a Federal
consumer credit disclosure regime. Robert Shay and William Brandt ex-
plained the basic idea, echoing the economic model discussed above:
"The Truth in Lending Act was predicated on two assumptions: (1) con-
sumers were not knowledgeable about APRs and finance charges, and
(2) the availability of such information would lead to more informed
44 Peterson, supra note 3, at 875-76. See also H.R. REP. No. 90-1040 at 13 (1967) (not-
ing multiplicity of computation methods used by creditors in pre-TILA era); RENUART &
KEEST, supra note 11, at 81; Barry A. Abbott & John W. Campbell, The Truth in Lending Act
After 15 Years: Its Goals and Its Limitations, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
45 This concern about the inability of consumers to accurately assess and compare the
costs of credit must be viewed with the broader social and legal climate of the times in mind.
During the 1960s, the U.S. saw the rise of a consumers' rights movement whose followers
rallied against the purported exploitation of consumers at the hands of business interests. At
the same time, advocates for the poor, who were dubious about the ability of the marketplace
to protect the interests of the downtrodden, sought greater government intervention on behalf
of their constituencies. Thus, the consumer rights movement overlapped with the efforts of
anti-poverty advocates, and both groups were aided by liberal scholars, jurists, and legislators
who were reconsidering traditional laissez-faire approaches to contract law. For more general
background on the consumer rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970's, the following
texts are good starting points: GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMER-
CIALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA 145-169 (2000) (discussing emerging critiques of U.S.
consumerism and tracing the consumer rights movement from the 1960s to early 1970s); ROB-
ERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE MARKETPLACE 25-58 (1989);
MARK V. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (1971); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK,
REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 5-45
(1982) (an insider's perspective from a controversial former chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission).
46 Even though Senator Douglas departed from the U.S. Senate before TILA was passed,
he is credited with being the driving force behind the federal truth in lending movement. See
Rubin, supra note 3, at 242-53, 263-64 (describing Douglas's role in great detail); see also
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market Behav-
ior: A Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 117, 119 n.
10 (1984) ("The Act was the brainchild of Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois who introduced the
first truth-in-lending bill in the Senate in 1960 and kept the legislation alive through the early
1960s until 1966 when he failed in his re-election bid.") (citing Jonathan Landers, Some Re-
flections on Truth in Lending, 1977 ILL. L. J. 669); Peterson, supra note 3, at 877; H.R. REP.
90-1040 at 116 (1967) (supplemental views of Hon. Leonore K. Sullivan) (praising Senator
Douglas for his "imaginative development" of the truth-in-lending concept and the "indefati-
gable and patient and effective effort he devoted to its promotion"). Senator Douglas's own
views on the truth-in-lending movement can be found in PAUL H. DOUGLAS, IN OUR TIME 94-
122 (1968). After Douglas departed from the Senate, Senator William Proxmire (D. Wis.)
shepherded TILA though the Senate, while the "leading proponent" in the House of Represent-
atives was Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan (D. Mo.). See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note
15, 1.02[l], at 11; Peterson, supra note 3, at 879.
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credit decisions by facilitating the identification and comparison of shop-
ping terms."'47
After an intense legislative battle48 lasting through most of the
1960s, Congress finally passed the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") in
1968.49 TILA's passage reflected a monumental shift in the regulation of
the U.S. consumer-credit market. The Act began the process of estab-
lishing, for the first time in U.S. history, a mandatory, uniform disclosure
approach at a national level for virtually all consumer credit
transactions. 50
Despite the economic model and brief history outlined above, it
would be somewhat misleading to suggest that this "credit shopping"
view of TILA is beyond dispute. 51 In fact, a plethora of other goals have
47 Robert P. Shay & William K. Brandt, Public Regulation of Financial Services: The
Truth in Lending Act, in REGULATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES 199 (Arnold A.
Heggestad ed., 1981); see also Wesley A. Magat, Information Regulation, in 2 THE NEW PAL-
GRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 307, 309 (1998) (discussing basic economic
premises of information disclosure regulation).
48 The details of this legislative struggle will not be recounted here. For an excellent, in-
depth legislative history of the original version of the Truth in Lending Act, see Rubin, supra
note 3, at 242-63; see also Peterson, supra note 3, at 877-80; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note
15, 1.02[l]; MARK V. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 130-37 (1971).
49 See Pub. L. No. 90-321 (1968) (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e
(2003)). The Truth in Lending Act was the central element of a larger piece of federal con-
sumer law legislation-the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"). At the time of its
passage in 1968, the CCPA also included a title that restricted the garnishment of wages. See
Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 301-307 (1968) (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77
(2003)). The CCPA was later amended to include (1) the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2003); (2) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (2003); (3) the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2003); (4) the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2003); and (5) the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1637 (2003).
50 See Landers, supra note 11, at 686 ("Perhaps the most enduring quality of TIL is the
greater standardization of the terminology of credit transactions and the increasing use of an-
nual percentage rate and finance charge in variable transactions."); see also Ralph J. Rohner.
Whither Truth in Lending?, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 114, 117 (1996). A leading treatise
explains that TILA has produced, since its enactment:
[A] more standardized vocabulary for credit transactions; compliance headaches for
creditors seeking to fathom the intricate rules and subrules of the TIL Act and its
attendant regulations, commentary, and judicial constructions; thousands of lawsuits;
and probably some real increases in consumer sophistication about the credit trans-
actions they enter.
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, $ 1.01, at 3-4.
51 See Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 112-15; Kofele-Kale, supra note 46, at
126-27; Landers & Chandler, supra note 11, at 63-65; Landers, supra note 11, at 671-74
(discussing shifting purposes of TILA in the pre-Simplification era); Ralph J. Rohner, Truth in
Lending "Simplified": Simplified? 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 999, 1002-1004 (1981); Rubin, supra
note 3, at 235-36, 283-85; Whitford, supra note 34, at 404; Patrick E. Hoog, Note, Accelera-
tion Clause Disclosure: A Truth in Lending Policy Analysis, 53 IND. L. J. 97, 111 (1977)
(discussing Congressional imprecision in setting forth the goals of TILA).
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been ascribed to the Act, 52 including the goal of economic stabilization,
which is mentioned in the text of the statute. 53 Still, the credit shopping
view of TILA is dominant. To start, the Act itself states:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be
enhanced and the competition among the various finan-
cial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension
of consumer credit would be strengthened by the in-
formed use of credit. The informed use of credit results
from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It
is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit .... 54
This basic concept, that TILA was "Congress's effort to guarantee
the accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit
and thereby to enable consumers to make informed choices in the credit
marketplace," 55 has been echoed in law reviews, social science litera-
52 To illustrate the extent of the debate over the purposes of TILA, two experts compiled
a list of no less than thirty-eight goals that have been advanced for truth-in-lending law, which
they grouped into the following six categories: (1) credit market goals, (2) buyer behavior
goals, (3) general philosophical and educational goals, (4) macroeconomic goals, (5) institu-
tional control goals, and (6) market protection goals. See Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 1,
at 114 (tbl. 1). Durkin and Elliehausen warn of the dangers inherent in trying to evaluate the
success of a statute based upon one evaluative criterion, especially when so many varied goals
have been put forth in support of TILA and so little of the empirical evidence directly assesses
these goals. Id. at 112-13. Moreover, it could be argued that reducing information asymme-
tries and encouraging credit shopping are not goals in and of themselves, but rather that they
are best viewed as instrumentalities or means for achieving further social ends such as in-
creased market efficiency.
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The macroeconomic goal of economic stabilization is rarely
invoked as a justification for TILA in current policy debates. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 235
(discussing the goal of economic stabilization and concluding: "Whether the proponents of
Truth-in-Lending ever intended this argument to be taken seriously is an interesting question,
and one that seems fated to remain a mystery.").
54 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2003) (emphasis added). A clause regarding credit billing later
was added to section 1601(a), as part of the Fair Credit Billing Act. See Pub. L. 93-495, § 302
(1974) (adding that a purpose of TILA is "to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices").
55 RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.1.1, at 33.
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ture,56 treatises, 57 administrative regulations, 58  Supreme Court opin-
ions,59 and a variety of other prominent sources regarding TILA.6° Thus,
this Article will proceed cautiously under the assumption that TILA's
purpose was to reduce information asymmetries and facilitate credit
shopping with the ultimate goal of increasing market efficiency or
competitiveness.
56 See Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 192-93 ("The stated goals of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act are to increase economic stability, to enhance the ability of consumers to shop for
attractive loan terms, and to prevent inaccurate and unfair billing."); Keest, supra note 3, at
360 ("Truth in Lending was created to bring honesty and accuracy to the consumer credit
marketplace. To that end, TIL's key 'price tag' disclosures of the APR and finance charge
were defined to include ... all the costs attendant to the credit that the borrower would have to
pay."); Landers & Chandler, supra note 11, at 60; Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 67 (1999)
('TILA was enacted . . . to help consumers make informed decisions about using credit and
promote price competition by facilitating comparison shopping."); Hoog, supra note 51, at 101
("The first goal of the disclosure requirements of the TIL Act is to promote comparative shop-
ping by consumers among creditors in the pursuit of increased competition among credit
extenders.").
57 See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 275, at 480 ('The basic idea of Truth in
Lending is, as the name suggests, to ensure that those who 'lend' money (or, what amounts to
the same thing, sell goods on 'time') will disclose the 'truth' about the terms of the transaction,
so that the consumer who borrows (or buys on credit) will know what he is getting into."); id.
§ 317, at 526 ("The primary objective of Truth in Lending is to provide consumers with infor-
mation to enable them to shop for the most advantageous credit terms."); ROHNER & MILLER,
supra note 11, at 4 ("The primary purpose of the TIL Act is to promote the informed use of
credit. . . . The original purpose of the proposals that became the TIL Act was to assure
accurate and uniformly computed disclosures of the critical elements of credit costs.").
58 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (stating that the purpose of Regulation Z "is to promote the
informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and cost").
59 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559 (1981) ("The Truth in
Lending Act has the broad purpose of promoting 'the informed use of credit' by assuring
,meaningful disclosure of credit terms' to consumers.") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1601); Mourning
v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973) ("The Truth in Lending Act
reflects a transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of 'Let the buyer beware' to one
of 'Let the seller disclose.'").
60 See FRBJHUD Report, supra note 15, at 7 ("TILA seeks to promote the informed use
of credit through standardized disclosures that reflect the cost of credit over the life of a loan
and highlight certain credit terms."); NCCF REPORT, supra note 41, at 171-75 (discussing
various purposes of the Truth in Lending Act, including: (1) facilitating comparison shopping
for consumer credit; (2) enabling consumers to determine how to best utilize consumer credit,
if at all, after shopping for credit; and (3) promoting economic stability); id. at 191 (stating that
TILA's intent was "to enable consumers to comparison shop for credit, to choose between
using credit or liquid assets and between credit and delayed consumption, and to assist in
economic stabilization," but not "to remedy all abuses in the credit market or to fix rates of
charge on consumer credit transactions").
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C. THE BASICS OF THE TILA REGIME
The Federal Truth-in-Lending regime 61 today consists of a complex
combination of statutory 62 and administrative provisions. Although Con-
gress delegated rulemaking responsibility for implementing TILA to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 63 enforcement au-
thority for the Act was divided among nine Federal agencies, 64 led by the
Federal Trade Commission.65 In response to its mandate, the Federal
Reserve Board [FRB] promulgated extensive Truth-in-Lending regula-
tions collectively known as "Regulation Z.''66 In addition, the FRB staff
has issued legally binding Commentary interpreting both the Act and
Regulation Z.67
61 For those interested in comprehensive treatments of Federal truth-in-lending law, the
following two resources are indispensable: ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST,
TRUTH IN LENDING (4th ed. 1999 & 2000 Supp.); RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER,
TRUTH IN LENDING (Robert A. Cook et al., eds., 2000). The National Consumer Law Center
released a revised, fifth edition of its Truth in Lending manual just as this Article was being
completed.
62 The Truth in Lending Act has been amended many times since its initial passage in
1968. See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1.02[6], at 22-24 (chart summarizing all
legislative enactments that constitute the Truth in Lending Act). In its present form, TILA has
five parts: Parts A and B which set forth the general rules for the statutory scheme and many of
the mandatory consumer credit disclosures required under the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-49
(2003); Part C, which addresses credit advertising, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1665(b) (2003); Part D,
which governs credit billing practices, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (2003); and Part E, which is
the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (2003). See RENUART & KEEST,
supra note 11, § 1.3, at 41-42 (outlining TILA); ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, at
1.02[6], at 22-24.
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2003).
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)-(c); ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, at 483 n. 6; ROHNER &
MILLER, supra note 11, 13.02, at 886-88; Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1305 n. 211;
Schiltz, supra note 20, at 535.
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c).
66 See 12 C.F.R. Part 226. Congress later directed the Federal Reserve Board to create
model disclosure provisions and forms for common transactions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b); see
also 12 C.F.R. Part 226, App. G-H (model forms and clauses). At times, this Article will only
cite to Regulation Z as opposed to the applicable statutory provisions. This is because Regula-
tion Z repeats many of the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act verbatim, and, in some
ways, Regulation Z is considered to be a more definitive statement of truth-in-lending law than
the Act. See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1.03[l], at 25-26.
67 The Official Staff Commentary of Regulation Z is promulgated by the staff of the
Division of Consumer Affairs of the Federal Reserve Board. See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra
note 16, at 483-85 (discussing administrative implementation of TILA by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System); RENUART & KEEST, supra note l1, § 1.4.3, at 44-45;
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1 1.03[2][b], at 27-29 (explaining role of the FRB Com-
mentary). The FRB Commentary is Appendix C to Regulation Z. A creditor's good faith
compliance with the FRB Commentary precludes the imposition of civil liability under the
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(0. The Supreme Court has held that the Commentary is binding
unless it is demonstrably irrational. See Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 565-68.
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The core of Federal Truth-in-Lending law is theoretically straight-
forward.68 TILA and Regulation Z compel the mandatory disclosure of
specified information in connection with consumer credit transactions.69
A creditor's failure to comply with TILA's strictures can lead to civil
liability70 in the form of either actual 7' or statutory damages, 72 depend-
ing on the type of violation. 73 In addition, the statute imposes criminal
penalties for willful and knowing TILA violations. 74
The most crucial mandatory disclosures under TILA are those that
represent the cost of credit-the finance charge and the annual percent-
age rate ("APR"). 75 Regulation Z defines the finance charge, in part, as
follows:
The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a
dollar amount. It includes any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indi-
rectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of
the extension of credit. It does not include any charge of
a type payable in a comparable cash transaction. 76
68 In addition, TILA created several important substantive rights, such as the right to
rescind certain transactions, which will not be discussed in this Article. See supra note 16.
69 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12) ("'Consumer credit' means credit offered or extended to
a consumer primarily for personal, personal, family, or household purposes."); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(h) (defining the adjective "consumer"); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (defining "credit"); see
also ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, §§ 279-80, at 488-92.
TILA specifically exempts various non-consumer credit transactions. See 12 CFR
§ 226.3; see also ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 281, at 492-95; RENUART & KEEST,
supra note 11, § 2.4, at 66-77 (discussing exempt transactions).
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640; see also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, §§ 8.1-8.11, at 461-
531 (addressing all consumer remedies).
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640. But see ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 12.04[1], at 805
(noting difficulty in proving actual damages in many TILA cases).
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A); RO-4NER & MILLER, supra note 11, 12.04[2], at 809-
23.
73 Not all violations of TILA automatically trigger statutory damages. See RENUART &
KEEST, supra note 11, § 8.6.5, at 488-89; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1 12.04[2][a], at
810. The Act also provides for the provision of attorney's fees and costs. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (2003) (providing for a maximum fine of $5000 and a maximum of
one year's imprisonment for willful and knowing TILA violations).
75 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, at § 3. 1.1 ("The disclosure of the finance
charge is at the heart of Truth in Lending."); ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1.01[1], at 5
(referring to disclosure of the finance charge and APR as the "core of Truth in Lending");
Griffith, supra note 16, at 239; William J. O'Connor, Jr., 46 Bus. LAW. 1199, 1200 (1985)
(reviewing Ralph J. Rohner, TRUTH IN LENDING (1984)) (arguing that the critical legislative
innovation in TILA was the APR and noting that "[t]he combined annual percentage rate/
finance charge, although not completely successful from a logical, legal, or mathematical per-
spective, was a significant advance"); Peterson, supra note 3, at 880.
76 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2003) (providing statutory defini-
tion of finance charge); 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (2004) (explaining how to disclose finance
charge computation methodology on the initial disclosure statement for open-ended credit);
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 3.01[l], at 107 ("The finance charge is the consumer's
2005]
214 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:199
The annual percentage rate, or APR, is derived from the finance
charge, 77 and is best understood as "simply the relative or percentage
cost of credit on a yearly basis."'78 TILA's APR and finance charge dis-
closures are intended to provide borrowers with an accurate "price tag"
for the cost of credit to facilitate comparison shopping between lenders
and to encourage borrowers to consider whether the use of credit is pru-
dent.79 The vital importance of the finance charge and the APR is re-
flected in the fact that TILA requires both of these core disclosures to be
more prominently displayed than the Act's other mandatory disclo-
sures.80 Moreover, the exact terms "finance charge" 8' and "annual per-
centage rate" 82 must be used in the disclosures.
Although TILA's structure appears simple, complexity lurks be-
neath the surface. First, TLA follows a byzantine "some fees in, some
fees out" approach for determining whether particular fees or charges
imposed upon borrowers should be included in the finance charge and
thus the APR.83 This explains why the subject of APR and finance
charge determination has received so much administrative 84 and schol-
cost of credit, in dollars and cents."). Regulation Z states that it is permissible to use a brief
definition such as "the dollar amount the credit will cost you." 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d) (2004).
77 Under TILA, a creditor begins by determining the applicable finance charge and then
the APR is derived from the finance charge. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 3.1.1,
at 81; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, T 4.01[2][c][1], at 187. This Article does not address
the actuarial issues raised by the mathematical methodology applied by TILA and Regulation
Z to compute APRs. For an in-depth discussion of that subject, see ROHNER & MILLER, supra
note 11, at 179-239.
78 ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 317, at 526; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2003)
(determination of annual percentage rate); 12 CFR § 226.14(a) (determination of APR for
open-ended credit transactions); 12 CFR § 222.22(a) (2004) (determination of APR for closed-
ended credit transactions); ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, at 527-31 (determination of APR
for closed and open end transactions); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 3.1.1, at 81; ROH-
NER & MILLER, supra note 11, in 4.03-04, at 200-39 (closed and open end APRs). Regulation
Z states that it permissible to use a brief definition such as "the cost of your credit as a yearly
rate." 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e).
79 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 3.1.1, at 81; Keest, supra note 3, at 361
("[T]here can be no legitimate disagreement that on an individual basis, a price tag fully re-
flecting the entire price is necessary to determine whether credit is too expensive, and the
consumer should 'just say no' to debt.").
In addition to influencing shopping behavior, TIL is concerned with preventing the
excessive and untimely use of credit by consumers who are ignorant about credit
costs. The desired effect would be to help consumers choose between credit and
liquid assets (savings or available cash), or between credit and the postponement of a
purchase until cash is available.
William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An
Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending, 7 MICH. J. L. REF. 297, 313 (1974).
80 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(2).
81 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d).
82 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e).
83 See FRB/IHUD Report, supra note 15, at 8; see also infra Part II.B.2.b.
84 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (defining "finance charge"); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b) (providing
examples of finance charges); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d) (addressing treatment of insurance and
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arly 85 attention. Second, in addition to the APR and finance charge,
TILA sets forth many other required disclosures, some of which vary
depending on whether the credit at issue is open-ended, 86 like a credit
card or store charge card,87 or closed-ended, 88 like a typical automobile
loan or a home mortgage. 89 Third, as the consumer credit market devel-
oped during the 1980s and 1990s, Congress mandated additional distinc-
tive disclosures in areas such as credit advertising, 90 home equity loans,91
and so-called high interest rate or high fee home loans.92 Fourth, al-
debt cancellation coverage); Official Staff Commentary, § 226.6(b), Truth in Lending, 68 Fed.
Reg. 16,185 (Apr. 3, 2003) (providing guidance on a range of finance charge issues); FRB/
HUD Report, supra note 15, at Chs. 1-4; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Report to Congress, Finance Charges for Consumer Credit Under the Truth in Lending Act
(April 1996).
85 The topic of finance charges alone warrants a full chapter in each of the major TILA
treatises. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, at Ch. 3; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11,
at Ch. 3; see also ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, §§ 312-18 (detailing the computation of
the finance charge, including rules for the inclusion and exclusion of various fees); Elwin
Griffith, Searching for the Truth in Lending Identifying Some Problems in the Truth in Lend-
ing Act and Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 275-298 (2000); James Lockhart, What
Constitutes "Finance Charge" Under § 106(A) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S. C.A. §
1605(A)) or Applicable Regulations, 154 A.L.R. FED. 431 (1999).
86 Regulation Z defines open-end credit as "[c]onsumer credit extended by a creditor
under a plan in which: (i) The creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; (ii) The
creditor may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and
(iii) The amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the term of the plan (up
to any limit set by the creditor) is generally made available to the extent that any outstanding
balance is repaid." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20).
87 In the case of open-ended credit, creditors must provide an initial disclosure statement
before the first transaction is made under the plan, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(b)(1), 226.6, and
also must make regular, periodic statements as required by the regulations. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.5(b)(2), 226.7 (2004).
88 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10) (defining "closed-end credit" as "consumer credit other
than open-end credit as defined in this section").
89 Regulation Z sets forth the basic required closed end disclosures. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.18. In the interests of space, a full listing will not be provided here, but they include,
inter alia: the amount financed, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b); an itemization of the amount financed,
12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c); the finance charge, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d); the annual percentage rate,
12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e); the payment schedule, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(g); the total sale price, 12
C.F.R. § 226.18(j); any late payment penalties, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(1); and whether the creditor
has taken a security interest as part of the transaction, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m).
90 See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960
(1988), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1637, 1640 (2003); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a (disclo-
sures for credit and charge card applications and solicitations); RENUART & KEEST, supra note
11, § 5.4, at 312.
91 See Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act ("HELCPA"), Pub. L. No. 100-709,
102 Stat. 4725 (Nov. 23, 1988), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637a, 1647, 1665b (2003); see also
12 C.F.R. § 226.5b (illustrating special disclosures for lines of credit secured by a dwelling);
RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 5.18, at 322-36; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11,
6.07, at 425-37, 11.04[4], at 763-65.
92 See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), Pub. L. No. 103-325,
108 Stat. 2160 (1994), codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2003). Under HOEPA,
additional disclosures are required for home equity loans that bear interest rates or fees above
certain trigger levels set by the applicable statutes and regulations. See 15 U.S.C.
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though it is not a part of TILA, 93 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act 94 ("RESPA") operates in concert with TILA and mandates additional
disclosures in connection with loans secured by a dwelling. 95
In sum, one must be cognizant of the type of credit being extended
as well as the terms of the credit contract to determine which disclosures,
in addition to the APR and finance charge, are required under TILA and
any other applicable Federal 96 and state laws. 97 This Article, however,
will focus on these two major "cost-of-credit" disclosures, given that
they are the heart of the mandatory disclosure regime.
II. CRITIQUES OF TILA'S MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE REGIME
A. INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1968, TILA has engendered significant criti-
cism questioning the instrumental rationality 98 of the Act's mandatory
disclosure mechanisms.99 The assault was particularly intense during the
first decade of the Act's existence, when TILA came under steady attack
by legal scholars and the consumer credit industry. 100 Many of the criti-
§ 1602(aa)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i). In addition, HOEPA
provides several substantive protections, such as limitations on prepayment penalties and bal-
loon payments. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 613-16.
93 The concept of Federal truth-in-lending law is sometimes taken to include other Fed-
eral consumer protection laws that mandate disclosure to borrowers, such as RESPA. See
ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 275, at 480 n. 3 ("In a broader sense.., the term 'Truth in
Lending' is used to refer to all aspects of consumer credit law.").
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2003).
95 For explanations of how TILA interacts with RESPA, see FRB/HUD Report, supra
note 15, at Chs. 1-4; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 15, T 6.06, at 414-20; Sovern, supra note
6, at 76-77.
96 Compare ROHNER & MILLER, supra note I1, 14.01 (noting that TILA "is essentially
a free-standing law that does not displace, overlap, or interact with other federal laws"); with
Heselton, McCaffrey, & Miller, supra note 41, at 30-32 (discussing how TILA is integrated
with the Fair Credit Billing Act and RESPA).
97 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note I1, § 2.5, at 77-79.
98 See Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administra-
tive, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 147 (2003) (explaining that, in a simple form, "instrumental
rationality involves the choice of means that are best suited to achieve a pre-established end")
(citing 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24-25 (Guenther, Roth, & Claus Wittich, eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., 1978)).
99 This simply means that the critiques of TILA have not challenged the normative desir-
ability of the Act's goals or purposes. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the purposes of TILA). Rather, the critiques have accepted the legitimacy of the Act's
purposes, broadly speaking, but have questioned whether the regulatory or legislative means
selected to accomplish these goals have been instrumentally effective.
100 See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 272, at 476-77; ROHNER & MILLER, supra
note 11, 1.02[2]-[3], at 13-18; William Boyd, The Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act - A Much Needed Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come - Part 1, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1981) (discussing criticisms of TILA); Rohner, supra note 51, at 1004-1007
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ques from this period involved questions regarding the burdens that the
regulatory regime and TILA litigation imposed upon creditors. 10 Ob-
servers argued that the morass of hyper-technical regulations and volu-
minous administrative interpretations, 0 2 when combined with
unforgiving judicial application of TILA, led to a regime where creditor
compliance was extraordinarily difficult to achieve and the penalties for
minor non-compliance were unfair and disproportionately harsh. 10 3 The
end result, critics asserted, was a TILA litigation explosion' 04 fueled by
the consumer finance equivalent of "ambulance chasing attorneys."'10 5 A
Senate Report summed up the criticism as follows:
(summarizing critiques of TILA). An excellent example of a critique from the pre-Simplifica-
tion era is Landers & Rohner, supra note 34.
101 There is no doubt that mandatory disclosure regimes carry costs, and that those who
pay these costs are likely to object to their imposition. From a legislative standpoint, the more
pertinent inquiry is whether the costs of a particular regulatory regime outweigh the benefits.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 13.3, at 388 (6th ed. 2003) ("Viewed
as a method of standardizing complex financial information [TILA] can be defended, although
its benefits would have to be weighed against its not inconsiderable costs in fomenting litiga-
tion."); Gregory Elliehausen & Barbara R. Lowrey, The Cost of Implementing Consumer Fi-
nance Regulations: An Analysis of Experience with the Truth in Savings Act, FEDERAL
RESERVE BULLETIN 170 (December 1997); Garwood, Hobbs, & Miller, supra note 1, at 784
("[T]he cost of preparing forms, training personnel, monitoring compliance attempts, and the
like for disclosure is not cheap. While effective disclosure allocates resources and produces
other benefits that probably justify such expenditures, ineffective disclosure produces little to
justify its cost, and may even misallocate resources."); Sherrill Shaffer, Rethinking Disclosure
Requirements, Bus. REv. (May/June 1995), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/br/in-
dex.html (discussing the costs of various disclosure statutes, including TILA, and cautioning
against the use of mandatory disclosure in the absence of thorough and continuing cost-benefit
analysis); Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psy-
chology, Marketing, and the Law of Information Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health
Care, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 253 (1995) ("TILA disclosure also reinforces the notion that
information strategies can be expensive .... These costs are passed on to consumers in the
form of higher fees, higher borrowing rates, and lower interest rates on deposits."). But see
Whitford, supra note 34, at 432-33 (observing that the cost of government oversight does not
seem to have been a major issue in the implementation of TILA).
102 See Rohner, supra note 51, at 1005 ("By 1980, the Federal Reserve had issued more
than sixty official Board Interpretations and more than 1500 official and unofficial staff letter
interpretations of Regulation Z. Accompanying this explosion in the interpretation process
was inconsistent judicial resolution of numerous questions under the Act and Regulation.").
103 See Abbott & Campbell, supra note 44, at 5-8; Rubin supra note 3, at 236-38. Fifteen
years after TILA Simplification, some critics still adhered to this view. See, e.g., Robert A.
Cook, The Truth in Lending Act - A Review in Light of Its Original Purpose, 49 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP. 357, 358 (1995) (noting that "the failure of a lender to make meaningless
disclosures required by needlessly complex regulations can lead to harsh penalties that far
exceed any justifiable punishment").
104 See Abbott & Campbell, supra note 44, at 3, Boyd, supra note 100, at 3; Heselton,
McCaffrey, & Miller, supra note 41, at 39; Rohner, supra note 51, at 1005-06.
105 Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 3 (1979) (statement of Sen. Gain) (referring
to "ambulance chasing attorneys who have quit chasing ambulances and now follow Truth in
Leading violations to pick up a quick buck").
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Creditors . . . have encountered increasing difficulty in
keeping current with a steady stream of administrative
interpretations and amendments, as well as highly tech-
nical judicial decisions. There is also evidence that
many creditors have sincerely tried to comply with the
act but, due to its increasing complexity and frequent
changes, have nonetheless found themselves in violation
and subject to litigation.' 0 6
To address these problems, Congress passed the Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act in 1980,107 which seemed to mute the
most vociferous creditors' complaints.10 8 Although additional issues
have emerged during the last two decades regarding the regulatory bur-
dens on creditors, 0 9 such matters (though important) will be placed to
106 S. REp. 96-73, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 281.
107 Congress passed the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, as Title V of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. See Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 221 (1980). These major changes to TILA "were more than enough to justify
the Federal Reserve Board's characterization of the legislation as 'a new Truth in Lending
Act."' RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.2.2, at 36-38 (citing Federal Reserve Board,
Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation Z, 46 FED. REG. 20941, 20949 (1981)); Peterson,
supra note 3, at 889. The revision to TILA became effective in 1982, see Pub. L. No. 96-221,
§ 301, and a new version of Regulation Z was issued to reflect the changes in the Act. See
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, 1 1.03[1], at 16-18. For background on TILA Simplifica-
tion, see RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, at § 1.2.2.1, at 36; ROHNER & MILLER, supra note
11, at 1 1.02[2]-[3], at 13-18; William E. Boyd, The Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act - A Much Needed Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come - Part 1, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 (1981); Timothy D. Marrinan & Peter D. Schellie, Truth in Lending Simplification, 37
Bus. LAW. 1297 (1982); Rohner, supra note 51.
108 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 890 ("[l]ndustry has come to a grudging acceptance of
Truth in Lending as litigation and compliance problems have largely been solved.").
109 This is not to say that additional problems have never arisen regarding litigation and
regulatory burdens on creditors. The most significant recent example involves the firestorm
surrounding the Eleventh Circuit's controversial decision in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16
F.3d 1142 (1 1th Cir. 1994). The Rodash court held that a borrower was permitted to rescind a
mortgage refinancing loan and recover all fees and finance charges that had been paid, because
the creditor failed to include $22 in courier fees and a $200 state tax in the finance charge
calculation. The disclosure errors that warranted rescission of the loan agreement in Rodash
apparently were widespread in the mortgage industry, and following the Rodash decision, a
series of class action lawsuits were filed seeking the rescission of arguably billions of dollars
worth of loan agreements. Fearing the effects of these lawsuits on the mortgage industry (and
the U.S. economy), Congress passed a temporary class action moratorium, followed by the
Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (1995), which
"made significant revisions to the rules for determining the finance charge, disclosure toler-
ances, civil liability and the right of rescission in closed-end transactions." Rohner & Miller,
supra note 11, 1 1.02[4], at 20. For further discussions of the 1995 Act, see Robert A. Cook
and Robert R. Wisner, Truth in Lending - A Whirlwind Year, 51 Bus. L. REV. 861 (1996) ;
Robert A. Cook, Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, 49 CONSUMER FIN, L. Q. REP. 239
(1995); see also RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.2.3, at 39-41; ROHNER & MILLER,
supra note 11, at 359-63; Griffith, supra note 16, at 194-96. The Rodash story illustrates that
the TILA regime's burdens on creditors still potentially have the potential to raise credit indus-
try concerns, but that rapid Congressional action can mute such disquiet before it becomes the
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the side in this article. Instead, this Article will focus on critiques re-
garding efficacy of TILA's mandatory disclosure mechanisms-empiri-
cal and theoretical inquiries into whether TILA has succeeded in
reducing information asymmetries and indeed has fostered comparison
shopping for consumer credit.I 10
B. CRITIQUES OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AS A SOLUTION FOR
INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
1. Introduction
Many critiques of TILA involve an interrelated set of empirical, the-
oretical, and behavioral questions concerning whether TILA's mandatory
disclosure mechanisms truly reduce information asymmetries in the con-
sumer finance market and facilitate comparison-shopping for credit.
This was a major concern in the pre-simplification era' and today re-
mains a subject vital to academics and consumer rights activists. By ap-
plying a variety of social science methods to the consumer credit market,
critics aim to cast doubt on TILA's economic model by suggesting that
consumers, for a variety of reasons, fail to engage in effective compari-
son-shopping for credit, even though they have been provided with the
disclosures that TILA requires." 12 There are two possible categories of
reasons for why the problems of imperfect information might persist de-
fodder for sustained scholarly reflection. A cynic might argue that the 1995 Amendments
show that a Republican Congress will satisfy the demands of the banking industry to the
detriment of consumers. See John Roddy, Reversing Field: Is There a Trend Toward Abrogat-
ing Truth in Lending?, 1 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LITIG. 637, 639 (1998) ("TILA was
amended in 1980, refined and tamed in many respects, but it still retained most of its teeth.
TILA was again amended in 1995 though, this time having most of those teeth extracted."). It
should be noted that President Clinton, a Democrat, signed the 1995 Amendments bill into
law.
110 In this Article, I often will address all parts of the consumer credit market together.
Obviously, the sub-markets for the myriad forms of consumer credit are quite distinct in many
respects. This fact is reflected in the scholarship in the field, which at times addresses home
mortgages, credit cards, payday loans and other forms of credit separately. Nevertheless, the
information asymmetries to which I will be referring often cut across different parts of the
consumer credit market. I do concede, of course, that the exact dimensions of the information
problems might differ depending on the type of consumer credit at issue, and, as I will discuss
later, this leads to the conclusion that properly designed disclosure might vary from one seg-
ment of the market to another. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
I ' I See supra notes 100-01 (discussing the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act).
112 See Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1299 n. 66 (1994) ("The underlying assumption of disclosure statutes is
that consumers act as rational wealth-maximizers and will use the information supplied by
disclosure statutes to shop around to get the best deal .... Empirical studies have tended to
show, however, that consumers do not actually behave that way.") (citing William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with
the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1083, 1113-15 (1984) (discussing studies that found that consumers do not shop around
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spite TILA's disclosure regime: (1) consumers still might not be receiv-
ing the necessary information in the marketplace to make optimal
choices, despite TILA's mandates;" 3 or (2) consumers might be poorly
processing the information that TILA requires and the market pro-
duces.' 4 In other words, we can ask both whether there is a problem
with the TILA regime itself in terms of the content or delivery of the
mandatory disclosures and whether consumers are willing or able to avail
themselves of the information that TILA (or the market) provides. The
following section will survey the main instrumental critiques that have
been levied against TILA during the past three decades.
2. Design Defects in the TILA Regime
To assist consumers' credit-shopping processes, mandatory disclo-
sures must include clear information' 15 in manageable quantities"16 and
be made at a time when they can actually affect market behavior." 17
and instead settle for what is acceptable rather than search for what is best)); Kofele-Kale,
supra note 46, at 146-47 (criticizing economic model of consumer behavior).
1 13 My emphasis here is on whether the information required by TILA is what consumers
need. I will not address the important question of creditor compliance with TILA-that is,
whether creditors are indeed providing the information mandated by the statute. Compare
Cecil J. Hunt, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending
Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 286 (2003) ("[T]he
disclosure requirements have been frequently ignored and abused by lenders and infrequently
and inconsistently enforced by the courts. There are many reported instances where lenders'
required TILA disclosures have been misleading, false, late, incomplete, or altogether non-
existent."); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 46-49 (2002) (addressing non-compliance with T1LA) with Elizabeth C. Yen,
Current Truth in Lending Issues, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 25 (1998) (concluding that
although some honest errors are made and some dishonesty exists, "overall it seems that a
majority of consumer credit transactions are probably accompanied by disclosures that sub-
stantially (if not fully) comply with TILA").
114 This framework is taken from David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz, & Louis L. Wilde,
The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 277, 277-78 (1986). In addition, consumers could receive all of the information that they
need in a desired form and amount, but still make choices that have detrimental effect on other
consumers or society. See Paul N. Bloom, A Decision Model for Prioritizing and Addressing
Consumer Information Problems, 8 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 161, 163 (1989) (citing as
examples cigarettes, motorcycles, and alcohol but noting that such decisions are unlikely to be
related to the adequacy of information consumers possess).
115 See Garwood, Hobbs, & Miller, supra note 1, at 782 (noting that a "prerequisite of
effective disclosure is that it must be uniform and clear" and stating that "disclosures must be
brief and simple enough to be readily assimilated").
116 See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 16, § 311, at 517 ("The concept of meaningful
disclosure does not mean more disclosure; rather, it describes a balance between competing
considerations of complete disclosure and the need to avoid 'informational overload.' ") (citing
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1981) (quoting S. REP. 96-73 at 3
(1979))); see also supra notes 118-132 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of in-
formation overload).
117 See Garwood, Hobbs, & Miller, supra note 1, at 781-782 ("[D]isclosure generally
should come at a time to permit the utilization of alternative sources to obtain the consumer
CRITIQUES OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Critics have pointed to three possible fundamental design defects in the
TILA regime that may impede effective comparison shopping for credit:
(a) the overwhelming nature of TILA disclosures; (b) TILA's flawed fi-
nance charge definition; and (c) the late timing of TILA's disclosures in
the credit shopping process.
a) Information Overload
Prior to TILA Simplification, scholars' t 8 and regulators t 19 asserted
that the Act failed to facilitate credit shopping because consumers were
cognitively unable to cope with the voluminous nature of the mandated
TILA disclosures. Relying on emerging empirical evidence, proponents
of this view claimed that consumers were suffering from something
known as "information overload,"' 20 a controversial and multifaceted
concept borrowed from the social sciences.' 2' Needless to say, con-
financial services sought."); Cook, supra note 103, at 359 (discussing how early disclosures
are necessary for consumers to be able to shop effectively).
118 See Landers & Rohner, supra note 34, at 722-25 (discussing information overload and
TILA); Peterson, supra note 3, at 887 ("[T]he credit industry as well as many neutral academ-
ics led a rhetorical challenge to TILA asserting the information provided to debtors was not
useful. A body of academic literature had developed discussing Truth in Lending even before
Congress adopted the Act, but it has grown larger and decidedly more skeptical."); Rohner,
supra note 51, at 1006-07; Elizabeth J. Keeler, The Truth in Lending Simplification and Re-
form Act of 1980: Is "Simplification" Better for Both Consumer and Creditor, 8 NovA. L. J.
175, 184-85 (1983) (discussing how consumers overwhelmed with information will fail to
digest any of the disclosures); Penzer, supra note 101, at 250 ("Critics of the original Truth In
Lending Act charged that Truth in Lending disclosures overwhelmed consumers with too
much complicated information and ultimately discouraged them from credit shopping.").
119 See Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,
95th Cong. 16 (1977) (statement of Philip C. Jackson, Jr., Federal Reserve Board Governor)
(arguing that TILA disclosures were potentially overwhelming in pre-Simplification era).
120 See Sovern, supra note 6, at 27-28 ("Information overload may occur when consumers
are given too much information in too little time, or information too complex to grasp.");
Landers & Rohner, supra note 34, at 722 ("The consumer's behavior in the transaction will not
be affected if the credit disclosures are so numerous and, in conjunction with the other contract
provisions, so formidable as to create a 'cognitive overload.' That is, the consumer becomes
overwhelmed by the aggregate mass of words and figures and reacts by ignoring the disclo-
sures entirely."); Kofele-Kale, supra note 46, at 128-29 (arguing that when consumers get too
much information, they ignore the information completely because they cannot process it);
Paredes, supra note 1, at 440-43. One student note author explained:
Put simply, overload theory postulates that consumers do not act as rational utility
maximizers in the face of an overabundance of data; instead, they completely ignore
most or all of the information presented. Consumers provided with too much infor-
mation disregard most of it and therefore make objectively poorer decisions. Alter-
natively, consumers may unconsciously avoid overload by selectively accessing
subsets of presented information. As a result, choices are based on a fraction of the
significant data.
Penzer, supra note 101, at 238-39.
121 See Sovem, supra note 6, at 28 n. 70 (collecting and discussing sources on informa-
tion overload within social science and law review literature); Penzer, supra note 101, at 238-
41 (summarizing and discussing debate on the validity of information overload theories); see
2005]
222 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:199
sumer rights advocates were skeptical of these criticisms and questioned
whether reducing the available information to consumers was the proper
way to solve TILA's alleged problems. 122 Congress, however, seized
upon the concept of information overload, and so TILA Simplification
and the subsequent revisions of Regulation Z were aimed at making
TILA's disclosures less overwhelming to consumers. 123
In the years since TILA Simplification, the academic debate over
the concept of information overload and its applicability to legal deci-
sion-making has persisted. 124 Although commentators continue to men-
tion information overload as a hazard that should be avoided, 125 as a
technical concept, it is rarely the centerpiece of academic criticism of
TILA as it was in the pre-Simplification era. 126 There are at least three
possible explanations for this trend. First, the application of information
overload theory to legal regulation has been subjected to a significant
amount of scrutiny and criticism. 27 Second, scholars may be wary about
advocating a position that might lead towards recommendations of less
disclosure for consumers. Third, TILA Simplification arguably amelio-
rated the worst of TILA's overload problems thus eliminating it as a
major scholarly concern.' 28
In any event, even though the tag of "information overload" is in-
voked less today, critics continue to claim that the disclosure regime fails
also James R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce, & Hohn W. Payne, Constructive Consumer
Choice Processes, 25 J. oF CONSUMER RES. 187, 199-200 (1998); Paredes, supra note 1, at
441-43 (noting "voluminous" academic discussion of the subject).
122 See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.2.2.1, at 37-38 ("[Cjonsumer advocates did
note that the disclosures could be made more readable and comprehensible. For the most part,
however, they did not lay much blame for any 'information overload' on flaws in TIL, but
rather on creditors' diligent efforts to make sure that they were well-protected in the event of
dispute or default."); ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, T 1.02[3], at 17 ("Consumer spokes-
persons were suspicious of the motives for TIL simplification, and were especially dubious of
the 'information overload' rationale. In their view, it had never been demonstrated reliably
that TIL disclosed too much information or that consumers overlooked the disclosures that was
[sic] available.").
123 See S. REP. No. 96-73, at 2-3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 280-82.
124 See Sovern, supra note 6, at 28 n. 70; Penzer, supra note 101, at 240-41; see also
Paredes, supra note 1, at 441-43.
125 See Garwood, Hobbs & Miller, supra note 1, at 782-83.
126 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledy-
gook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv.
841 (1977).
127 See Grether et al., supra note 114; see also Bettman et al., supra note 121, at 200;
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986); Paredes, supra note 1, at
443; Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their
Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1986); Sovem, supra note 6, at 28
n.70; Penzer, supra note 101, at 240-43.
128 Such optimism, if warranted, is more suited to the context of closed-end credit. See
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 11, at 17 (explaining that the most significant changes to the
disclosure regime were in the area of closed-end credit); Heselton, McCaffrey, & Miller, supra
note 41, at 54.
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to require the provision of key cost of credit information in an under-
standable and manageable format, especially for open-ended credit. For
example, home mortgage borrowers are often buried in paper, with little
guidance as to which documents contain the most crucial information to
facilitate consumer credit decision-making. 129 It would be a mistake to
attribute the mass of paper solely to Federal regulatory requirements. As
one author points out, much of the volume of disclosures is due to lender
requirements and state law, not Federal mandates. 130 It is also important
to look at how the disclosure rules interact. For example, credit card
providers are required to provide cost of credit information in what is
known as the "Schumer Box" at the time of application for a credit
card. 13 1 This tabular format is easy to read and understand. Yet, when
the credit card account is actually opened, consumers receive the TILA
disclosures in text rather than a tabular format because credit card com-
panies are not required to provide consumers with the information in a
Schumer Box at that stage. Therefore, consumers might have a difficult
time comparing the terms initially promised with the terms of the actual
credit arrangement. 132
b) APR and Finance Charge Definition Issues
The second potential design defect with TILA involves the Act's
reliance on the related concepts of the finance charge and APR.
133
TILA's APR provision comports with the notion that consumers are best
off when they have a single price tag that they can use to compare credit
providers and judge whether the use of credit is prudent. 134 At the out-
set, it should be noted that this threshold assumption could be chal-
lenged-observers have questioned whether the use of APRs might
distort the credit shopping process. 135 This objection, however, is not
129 See, e.g., White & Mansfield, supra note 2, at 238-40 (discussing voluminous nature
of TILA disclosures without using the term "information overload").
130 See Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market: Sug-
gested Reforms in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX. L. REV. 421,
431 n. 48 (2003) (discussing fixed-rate, nonpurchase money loans).
131 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a.
132 Elizabeth Renuart drew my attention to this issue. See National Consumer Law
Center, Comments Regarding Economic Growth and Paperwork Reduction Act "EGPRA ", 10-
11 (April 2004), at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/test-and comm/content/egrpra-
final.pdf.
133 See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of finance
charge and APR).
134 See Roy Goode, Instalment Credit Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICtIONARY OF
LAW AND EcONOMics 333, 333 (1998) (discussing crucial role of credit price disclosures, such
as the APR, in credit shopping); Keest, supra note 3, at 362-65.
135 See Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 194 ("[A] problem common to all scoring sys-
tems is that firms are driven to emphasize the measured attribute at the expense of hard-to-
measure attributes. If consumers focus disproportionately on the interest rate, lenders have an
incentive to compete over this term and provide less attractive collection terms or cut back on
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necessarily specific to TILA; it can be construed as a general objection to
the misuse of any single metric in complex decision-making. 136 A joint
Federal Reserve Board and HUD report explained:
[T]he APR does not, and is not intended to, consider all
of the factors that consumers weigh in determining the
best loan. For example, the APR cannot tell a consumer
whether the best economic choice is to bear credit costs
by paying interest paid over time in the rate or paying
points up-front; the answer may depend on how long the
borrower intends to hold the loan. Consumers who pre-
pay several points for a thirty-year mortgage and who
sell their homes after a brief period may have a higher
cash outlay over that period than for another loan with a
higher APR composed of fewer points and a higher in-
terest rate. Similarly, the APR does not, and is not in-
tended to, tell consumers about the financial impact of
the amount of the monthly payment or the down pay-
ment. And even if the APR could somehow enable con-
sumers to evaluate every cost, information unrelated to
costs-such as prepayment penalties or a creditor's abil-
ity to meet a selected closing date-can be as important
as costs for some consumers.' 37
customer service.") (citations omitted); see also Beales, Craswell, & Salop, Information Reme-
dies for Consumer Protection, supra note 8, at 412; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 244 (1995) (arguing that banks
have an incentive to keep activity fees lower and interest rates higher, because these are mat-
ters on which consumers focus, while compensating by cutting other costs, such as those re-
flected in less salient form contract provisions); Landers & Rohner, supra note 34, at 739
(discussing dangers of overemphasizing price terms).
136 See Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1134 (explaining difficulties with designing disclo-
sures that adequately convey the complexity of certain mortgage transactions). Some scholars
argue that lenders make credit contracts more complex than they need to be. See Peterson,
supra note 3, at 899 ("The credit industry has for years seized on the complaint that credit
disclosures are not useful because they are too hard to understand. But, a significant amount
of confusion is attributable to the industry's unnecessarily complex contracts which make cur-
rent disclosures awkward.") (footnote omitted); Rohner, supra note 51, at 115 ("It smacks of
hypocrisy for the industry to blame the complexity of disclosure rules on TILA when it is the
unending stream of new credit offerings and arrangements that is the source of the
complexity.").
137 FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at 9. The FRB/HUD Report was the product of a
Congressional mandate for both agencies to study ways to simplify and unify the disclosure
requirements under RESPA and TILA. See Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Re-
duction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2101, 110 Stat 3009 (1996). Eventually, efforts
to improve the coordination of TILA and RESPA failed. See Elizabeth C. Yen & Timothy P.
Meredith, Truth in Lending Developments in 1999 - Preparing for the New Millennium, 55
Bus. LAW. 1261, 1261 (2000); see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1309.
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Beyond these threshold questions about the general value of APRs,
scholars have claimed TILA's particular APR and finance charge defini-
tions may impede comparison shopping for credit. 138 The most common
critical argument is that TILA's systematic exclusion of certain fees and
costs from the definition of the finance charge, and thus the APR, 139
leads to a chronic understating of the cost of credit. As Professors Engel
and McCoy explain:
Under TILA, significant costs are excluded from the fi-
nance charge and APR, meaning that the reported total
cost of credit is too low. These exclusions include fees
for credit reports, appraisals, inspections by lenders,
flood certifications, document preparation, title searches,
and title insurance, as well as notary fees, recording fees,
and government taxes. 140
This has been a thorny, long-standing problem with TILA,' 41 and it
was one of the main issues addressed by the Federal Reserve Board and
HUD in their extensive joint study on TILA and RESPA. 142 On the one
hand, no one would doubt that it is valuable for consumers to have a
clear sense of the "true" cost of credit. There is something intuitively
disturbing about APRs that are kept artificially low through the exclusion
of certain fees. On the other hand, if we view TILA's main purpose as
the facilitation of comparison shopping between different providers of
credit, then TILA's system-wide "some fees in, some fees out" approach
would not necessarily be detrimental to consumers, so long as all of the
providers of credit followed the same rules for including and excluding
fees. In such a situation, consumers would still be able to choose the
cheaper provider of credit, although the total cost of credit would be
higher than the consumers believe.' 43
138 See Penzer, supra note 101, at 253 ("Even though APR disclosure is the centerpiece of
TILA, comparison shopping based on the APR is unhelpful in many common credit situa-
tions."). One example that has been noted is the difference between how the APR is computed
for open and closed-ended credit, which makes it difficult for consumers to compare credit
across product lines. See Garwood, Hobbs, & Miller, supra note 1, at 786; Rohner, supra note
51, at 120 (arguing that "it is time to think seriously of erasing or seriously blurring that line,
giving primacy to an open-end kind of regime"); Penzer, supra note 101, at 253.
139 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
140 Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269 (citing FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15); see
also Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1131-32; Peterson, supra note 3, at 899-901.
141 See FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that Congress carved out exceptions
from the definition of finance charge from the start).
142 See FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at 7-19.
143 This would be more of an issue if the consumer were trying to compare whether to use
cash or credit. But, in the case of home mortgages or other large ticket items, we can assume
that this is not typically the case.
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Unfortunately, things are not so simple. In reality, credit providers
charge a multiplicity of different fees, and inclusion in the APR is han-
dled inconsistently from lender to lender.' 44 Moreover, the judicial and
administrative process for resolving these distinctive approaches is
slow, 14 5 so at any one time competing creditors in the marketplace are in
fact treating arguably similar fees differently. 146 This means that a credi-
tor's APR might both understate the total cost of credit in an absolute
sense and impair comparison-shopping between providers of credit. The
Federal Reserve Board and HUD recommended changes to the defini-
tions of the APR to include more fees 147 and thus better reflect the "true"
cost of credit, but Congress has not acted on these recommendations.
Given the foregoing, it would not be an overstatement that the very core
of TILA-the provision of the finance charge and the APR to facilitate
comparison shopping-suffers from several theoretical and practical
problems that have vexed commentators and regulators from the very
passage of the Act. As the joint FRB/HUD Report shows, some of these
issues might be resolved by improving the statutory finance charge defi-
nition, but arguably there are larger issues that definitional tinkering
might not resolve.
c) Timing Problems
A third design defect with TILA involves the regime's disclosure
timing rules. 148 Critics long have argued that consumers do not receive
TILA disclosures early enough to facilitate shopping for closed-end
credit. 149 TILA generally requires that disclosures for closed-end
credit' 50 be made when the transaction is "consummated,"' 5 1 which is
144 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 901-02.
145 The Board noted that it receives thousands of telephone inquires per year inquiring as
to the proper way to characterize fees in connection with real estate transactions. See FRB/
HUD Report, supra note 15, at 11.
146 Peterson, supra note 3, at 902.
147 See FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at 13-16.
148 For a chart summarizing the timing rules for real estate transactions, see FRB/HUD
Report, supra note 15, at 38 (fig. 2).
149 See Cook, supra note 11, at 358-59 (arguing that disclosures to consumers should be
made when consumers shop for credit, through advertising disclosures); Durkin & Elliehausen,
supra note 1, at 125 ("Many observers over the years have noted...that the formal Truth-in-
Lending disclosure notices for closed-end credit typically are presented to the consumer after
the credit arrangements are negotiated (but before the contract is signed). Critics say this is
too late for shopping usefulness."); Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1128-30; Landers & Rohner,
supra note 34, at 715-16; Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 74; Peterson, supra note 3, at 898;
Rohner, supra note 51, at 1020.
150 This would not be a problem for open-ended credit in most cases because APR infor-
mation is disclosed in advertisements and solicitations. See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at
354.
151 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b) (2004). In addition, the disclosures must be made "clearly
and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep." 12 C.F.R.
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defined in Regulation Z as "the time that a consumer becomes contractu-
ally obligated on a credit transaction."' 152 Experts have pointed out that a
consumer is already verbally and psychologically committed to the deal
at this point, 153 making it unlikely that she will terminate the transaction
to engage in further comparison-shopping for credit. This pressure to
continue with the deal can be compounded by a variety of other factors,
including high-pressure tactics from salespeople who discourage con-
sumers from walking away from a deal at the point of consummation and
the burdens of further credit shopping. 154 Furthermore, these problems
are exacerbated in certain contexts. For example, some lenders verify
employment status for payday and car title loans before making the
TILA disclosures. 155 One easily can see how borrowers might be reluc-
tant to have their employment status verified multiple times in order to
comparison shop for loans. This might not be an issue for someone who
works for a large corporation (or an educational institution) where there
are independent human resource professionals who handle such inquir-
ies, but in other employment contexts, the employee might not want to
burden his boss or supervisor with such matters or make it known at all
that he is seeking such a loan.
RESPA attempts to ameliorate these timing issues and coordination
problems in the area of home mortgages, but numerous scholars claim
§ 226.17(a)(1); see also Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2000); Elwin Grif-
fith, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Confronting the Challenge in the Truth in Lending
Act and Regulation Z, 40 Hous. L. REV. 345, 351-60 (2003) (discussing the disclosure require-
ments under TILA and Regulation Z).
152 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (2004).
153 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 898 ("Truth in Lending disclosures come at, or very
shortly before, the consummation of a transaction to which the consumer is already verbally
and psychologically committed .... Moreover, it is equally unlikely that at this point the
consumer will opt to pay with cash."); see also Cook, supra note 11, at 358-59; Durkin &
Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 125; Landers & Rohner, supra note 34, at 715-16; Eskridge,
supra note 112, at 1128-29; Rohner, supra note 51, at 1021; John M. Drain, Jr., Note, Truth in
Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 89, 107 (1970) (noting that con-
sumers have already made the decision to buy once the contract stage has arrived so that he
will only read the contract if he distrusts the salesperson) (citing Robert L. Jordan & William
D. Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1320
(1966)).
154 See Kofele-Kale, supra note 46, at 129-30. In the area of mortgages, two scholars
explain that:
This state of affairs puts unsophisticated loan applicants at risk of high-pressure tac-
tics at closing, where borrowers may learn for the first time that they will be paying
higher interest, points, or fees. Confronted by surprise disclosures, they need finan-
cial or legal advice at the exact moment that they have to commit. Without that
advice, fearful that they will lose their loans and desperate for funds, most borrowers
sign the closing documents.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1307.
155 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 895-86.
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that these efforts have not been successful. 156 This too was a major sub-
ject of the Federal Reserve Board/HUD Report. 157 Under RESPA, a
lender must provide a good faith estimate of closing costs (GFE) to bor-
rowers within three days of their application 158 as well as an actual state-
ment of closing costs (the HUD-1) at closing. 159 Critics note that lenders
are not liable to borrowers for errors in either the GFE or the HUD- 1. 160
In addition, many lenders and mortgage brokers require borrowers to pay
an application fee before providing the GFE, thus limiting the GFE's
potential role as a shopping tool. 16 1 As noted before, the Federal Re-
serve Board/HUD Report suggested many changes to ameliorate these
timing and coordination problems and HUD proposed new rules to im-
prove the RESPA regime. 162 But after further consideration HUD with-
drew the proposal,' 63 and final action has not been taken on this front. 16
156 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269; Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1128-29
(discussing various reasons why the mortgage disclosures come too late in the borrower's
decision-making process to effectively affect transactional behavior); Kofele-Kale, supra note
46, at 129-30; Sovern, supra note 6, at 76-77.
157 See FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at 20-44.
158 See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(a) (2003); 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a)(1) (2004) (stating that if the
transaction is a residential mortgage covered by RESPA "the creditor shall make good faith
estimates of the disclosures required... before consummation, or shall deliver or place them in
the mail not later than three business days after the creditor receives the consumers written
application, whichever is earlier").
159 See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10 (2003). Technically, the rules state that the HUD-1 must be
available for inspection the day before closing, and that delivery of the HUD-l is to be made
"at or before the settlement." Id. RESPA disclosures have been the subject of recent discus-
sion within the press, because of the issue of "sticker shock" that homebuyers face when they
arrive at closing and find that the closing costs exceed the good faith estimate. See Patrick
Barta & Ruth Simon, Fee Dispute: Furor Greets Bid to Alter System of Closing Costs on
Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2003, at Al.
160 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269, 1306; FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15, at
20-21.
161 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1269; Eskridge, supra note 112, at 1129; FRB/
HUD Report, supra note 15, at 20-21.
162 See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2003); Sim-
plifying and Improving the Process of Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settlement Costs to
Consumers, Fed. Reg. 49134 (proposed July 29, 2002) (proposal was withdrawn).
163 See RESPA Rule Recalled, Reaction Distinct, 7 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP. No.
19, April 9, 2004; James R. Hagerty, White House Retreats on Plan over Mortgages - Rule to
Cut Fees for Loans Encountered Opposition from Small Service Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23,
2004, at A2; Jennifer Bayot, Revised Rules on Mortgages Are Scuttled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2004, at Cl; Letter from Alphonso Jackson, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development to Dr. John Graham, Administrator, Office of Management and
Budget (March 22, 2004), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/resparule.cfm (last visited
June 30, 2004).
164 Alphonso Jackson, now the HUD Secretary, has indicated that he will press ahead
with RESPA reform. Ben Whisenant, Secretary Proposes More RESPA Reform, AMERICAN
BANKER, June 3, 2004. But one must wonder whether reform is likely to occur in the near
future, given the difficulties encountered the last time that an attempt was made on this front.
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3. Psychological, Cognitive, Educational, and Behavioral
Critiques of TILA
The previous subsection addressed structural barriers to effective
consumer credit shopping created by the TILA regime itself. Observers,
however, also have noted a myriad of potential psychological, behav-
ioral, cognitive, and educational barriers to effective consumer credit
shopping.165 The following discussion will highlight the diverse theoret-
ical perspectives criticizing the basic economic model of TILA's
mandatory disclosure approach. 166
First, experts in the field express serious doubt as to whether con-
sumers read their TILA disclosures 167 -a viewpoint that finds some sup-
port in surveys of consumers. 68 For example, in 2001, 49% of one
survey's respondents agreed that they read their TILA statements care-
fully, 169 which represented a dramatic increase from the 1997 survey,
165 For general background on consumer decision-making processes, see Bettman et al.,
supra note 121.
166 A full treatment of the recent behavioral law and economics assault on the traditional
law and economics model of rational decision-making is beyond my scope here. For more on
that subject, see infra note 230.
167 See Cook, supra note 11, at 358 ("The percentage of mortgage customers and new car
buyers that read their disclosures cannot be large, and one can seriously question whether
anyone looks at the required disclosures that accompany new credit cards."); Elizabeth C. Yen,
Current Truth in Lending Issues, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 25, 26 (1998) ("Intellectually
honest consumer advocates, creditors, regulators and legislators might all privately concede
that the vast majority of consumers do not both read and fully comprehend TILA disclo-
sures."). To support this point Dwight Golann, the Chair of the Committee on Consumer
Financial Services of the ABA Section of Business Law, stated:
For some years I've had this guilty feeling because I never read the disclosure docu-
ments from my last mortgage refinancing, or any of the refinancings before that
either. There's this pile of disclosure papers at home; I keep them just in case. Re-
cently I finally pulled them out, thinking I should read a few. But I got only as far as
a full-page disclosure of the transfer of mortgage servicing rights before I decided I
can't take this any more. So I thought, if I don't read this stuff, how many other
people do?
Panel Discussion, Re-Examining Truth in Lending: Do Borrowers Actually Use Consumer
Disclosures?, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 3, 3 (1998).
168 In 2001, seventy-five percent of respondents agreed either somewhat or strongly that
TILA statements were complicated, and 66% agreed either somewhat or strongly that TILA
statements contain some information that is not very helpful. See Thomas A. Durkin, Consum-
ers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, FED. RES. BULL. 201, 208 (tbl.
9) (April 2002) (survey of holders of bank-type credit cards). On the positive side, 67% of the
respondents indicated that the TILA disclosures make people more confident when dealing
with creditors. Id.
169 Id. This includes respondents that agreed either somewhat or strongly with the stated
proposition. The population surveyed also changed from families that had incurred closed-
ended installment debt in the past year to those holding bank-type credit cards, but it seems
unlikely that this is responsible for the stated increase. I do not have any empirical proof to
dispute this claim, but it seems rather doubtful that nearly half of borrowers read their T1LA
statements closely. Thomas Durkin attributes this number in some degree to "yea saying," or
attempting to give the survey taker the "right" answer. Id. at 208.
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where only 29% of respondents agreed (69% disagreed) that "most peo-
ple" (as opposed to the respondent) read their disclosures carefully. 170 A
skeptic might think it unlikely that there was a dramatic increase in the
number of consumers reading TILA disclosures from 1997 to 2001.
Rather, the key is that the phrasing of the question was changed and that
people think that they read their disclosures but that other consumers do
not. 1
71
Second, even assuming that consumers read their disclosures, we
must face the issue of whether consumers truly understand the most vital
"price tag" concepts in the disclosures such as the APR. This empirical
question has drawn the attention of social scientists and legal scholars
over the past three decades,172 and the evidence is decidedly mixed.173
On the positive side, most scholars agree that there is evidence of an
increase in general public awareness of interest rates since TILA's pas-
sage in 1968.174 Before Congress passed TILA, only 27% of credit card
170 Id.
171 Id. at 208 ("[a] degree of belief among consumers that they exercise reasonable care
themselves but that others may be less inclined to do so").
172 Surveys of the empirical work on TILA may be found in the following sources: Dur-
kin & Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 119-136; Durkin, supra note 168; Hynes & Posner, supra
note 6, at 194; Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 67-68; Shay & Brandt, supra note 47; Sovern,
supra note 6, at 13, 28 n.70.
173 In the ever-evolving marketplace for consumer credit, it is always difficult to establish
causation and to establish with certainty whether specific changes in consumer awareness or
understanding are due to the Truth in Lending Act. As Thomas Durkin explains:
Assessing the direct effects of disclosure legislation in these areas is difficult. For
example, an apparent increase in consumers' understanding of credit matters might
be explained by improved disclosure laws, but it might also be explained by ad-
vances in education, more widespread and frequent use of credit, or by more-effec-
tive solicitations for credit, advertisements, and publications that are not specifically
tied to disclosure requirements.
Durkin, supra note 168, at 201.
174 See Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 1, at 122 ("[I]t appears reasonable to state that,
as a whole, the public's correct perception of consumer credit rates has risen in the three
decades since the Day-Brandt study that was conducted immediately after TIL."); Rubin,
supra note 3, at 235 ("The studies confirm that there has been a significant increase in con-
sumer awareness of the annual percentage rate.") (citing William K. Brandt & George S. Day,
Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lend-
ing, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 297, 302-03 (1974); George S. Day & William K. Brandt, A Study of
Consumer Credit Decisions: Implications for Present and Prospective Legislation, in I NA-
TIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., TECHNICAL STUDIES 47 (1973); Robert P. Shay & Milton
W. Schober, Consumer Awareness of Annual Percentage Rates Charge in Consumer Install-
ment Credit: Before and After Truth-in-Lending Became Effective, in I NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CONSUMER FIN., TECHNICAL STUDIES 7-8 (1973)); NCCF Report, supra note 41, at 175-77
(contending that, in general, APR awareness had increased in the fifteen months after the
passage of TILA, although problems remained in certain segments of the consumer credit
market) (citing Robert P. Shay & Milton W. Schober, supra note 174; Day & Brandt, supra
note 174); S. REP. No. 96-73 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 281 (discussing
increases in consumer awareness of APRs, open-end account rates and the cost of borrowing
from various lending institutions during the first ten years after TILA's passage).
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users were considered "aware" of APRs,175 whereas by 2001, this per-
centage had risen to over 80%.176 This impressive development makes
sense given that TILA created a new uniform vocabulary for consumer
credit transactions 177 and that competition between credit providers
based upon APRs has flourished.' 78 On the other hand, many observers
within the academic community contend that the public's general aware-
ness and appreciation of interest rates has not translated into the type of
understanding of the meaning of APRs 179 that is necessary for effective
credit comparison shopping.' 80  As Professor Edward Rubin explains,
TILA may have "succeeded in making consumers increasingly aware,
but it has not managed to explain to them what it is they have been made
aware of.' 181 More troubling, however, is "evidence that the beneficial
effects of... [TILA] in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive
loans may have been limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers."'' 82
This highlights two distinct areas of concern: first, possible links be-
tween economic class or educational levels and APR understanding, 83
175 For an explanation of the term "awareness" as it is used in this context, see Thomas A.
Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED. RES. BULL. 623, 630-31
(Sept. 2000).
176 See Durkin, supra note 168, at 207.
177 See Griffith, supra note 16, at 192; Rubin, supra note 3, at 235-36.
178 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 30, at 332 (noting interest rate competition in the
context of credit card lending).
179 APR awareness and understanding are necessary, though not sufficient, preconditions
to informed credit shopping behavior. See Durkin, supra note 175, at 630; Lee & Hogarth,
supra note 26, at 67 ("Awareness and understanding, however, are different; increased aware-
ness of the price of credit does not guarantee improvement in consumer understanding. There
is general consensus that consumers' lack of understanding is a problem in credit markets.")
(citing literature on the subject).
180 See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 67 ("There is a general consensus in the research
community that consumers do not seem to understand APRs.") (citing Regina Y. Chang &
Sherman Hanna, Consumer Credit Search Behavior, 16 J. CONSUMER STUDIES & HOME
ECON., 207 (1992); Ralph C. Kimball et al., Alternative Visions of Consumer Financial Ser-
vices, 19 J. OF RETAIL BANKING SERVICES 1 (1997); Jean Kinsey & Ray McAlister, Consumer
Knowledge of the Costs of Open-End Credit, 15 J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 249 (1981); Lewis
Mandell, Consumer Knowledge and Understanding of Consumer Credit, 7 J. OF CONSUMER
AFFAIRS 23 (1973); James H. McAlexander & Debra L. Scammon, Are Disclosures Sufficient?
A Micro Analysis of Impact in the Financial Services Market, 7 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKET-
ING 185 (1988); Anjan V. Thakor et al., Common Ground: Increasing Consumer Benefits and
Reducing Regulatory Costs in Banking, General Banking Study, prepared for the Herbert V.
Prochmow Educational Foundation, Graduate School of Banking, University of Wisconsin.
Barefoot, Marrinan & Associates, Inc.); Betty Jo White & Nancy A. Barclay, A Survey of
Consumer Difficulties with the Homebuying Process in One Colorado Community, 15 J. CON-
SUMER AFFAIRS 358 (1981); Whitford, supra note 34, at 417-18 (discussing early studies that
suggested that TILA did not promote comparative interest rate shopping).
181 Rubin, supra note 3, at 236.
182 Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 194 (collecting sources).
183 In their study of this issue, Lee and Hogarth did not find income to be associated
significantly with an understanding of the relationship between the APR and the contract inter-
est rate. See Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 70. But, they did conclude that education was
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and second, that some poorer shoppers may be focusing on issues other
than the APR in the credit shopping process, such as the minimum
monthly payment required under the credit contract.184
In addition to APR comprehension issues, scholars have raised other
concerns that would call into question whether consumers are suffi-
ciently well-informed or educated to comparison shop for credit. First,
some scholars have pointed out that many consumers in the consumer
credit market face English language problems that may interfere with a
full understanding of TILA disclosures. 185 Second, there are general lit-
eracy and educational problems in the population limiting consumer un-
derstanding of complex financial disclosures. 18 6 Third, some
commentators have begun to focus on the topic of "financial literacy" by
analyzing consumer knowledge and behavior regarding financial mat-
ters. 187 To some extent, these concerns over consumer literacy and un-
associated with understanding of the APR-CIR relationship, given that those with a graduate
education understood the APR-CIR relationship better than those with a high school education
or less. Id. Interestingly, consumers who attended or graduated from college did no better
than those with a high school education or less. Id.
184 See POSNER, supra note 101, § 13.3, at 389 (noting that those who are "liquidity-
constrained" may be weighing considerations that are not captured in an interest rate); Patricia
A. McCoy, Predatory Lending Practices: Definition and Behavioral Implications, in WHY THE
POOR PAY MORE: HOW TO STOP PREDATORY LENDING 94 (Gregory D. Squires, ed. 2004)
(citing George S. Day and William K. Brandt, Consumer Research and the Evaluation of
Information Disclosure Requirements: The Case of Truth in Lending, I JOURNAL OF CON-
SUMER RESEARCH 22, 22-23 (1974); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. OF
BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 187, 187-88 (1998)); Kofele-Kale, supra note 46, at 142 (dis-
cussing non-economic considerations that influence low-income shoppers, such as the fear of
rejection from a new source of credit or lender and noting that subprime customers "tend to
focus on whether the monthly payments offered are affordable, rather than on lower interest
rates"); see also lain Ramsey, Consumer Protection, in I NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 410, 412 (1998) ("Low-income consumers may be practicing ra-
tional ignorance in failing to learn the finer points of the APR... on their credit contract, when
they have limited choices of credit.").
At the same time, it is important to distinguish true borrowers from "convenience" credit
card users who do not carry a balance from month to month. See Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M.
Hogarth, Relationships Among Information Search Activities When Shopping for a Credit
Card, 34 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 330, 333-34 (2000) (distinguishing shopping behavior of con-
venience card holders and "revolvers" who carry debt): Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of
Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 101-02 (2000) (noting that "convenience" credit card users,
who constitute the majority of cardholders, are less interested in interest rates than card bene-
fits because they do not intend to carry a balance from month to month).
185 See Bender, supra note 16, at 1075-77; Peterson, supra note 3, at 893.
186 See White & Mansfield, supra note 2; Bender, supra note 16, at 1074-75; Panel Dis-
cussion, supra note 167, at 4 (comments of Kathleen E. Keest).
187 See, e.g., Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household Finarcial Manage-
ment: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, FED. RES. BULL. 309 (July 2003)
(analyzing consumer survey research on four household financial-management practices: cash-
flow management, credit management, saving, and investment); Lee & Hogarth, supra note
26, at 74-75 (discussing study in which at least 40% of closed-end mortgage borrowers did not
understand the relationship between the contract interest rate and the APR, a lack of under-
standing that might impair a rational borrowing decisions).
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derstanding overlap with the "information overload" concerns discussed
above,' 88 with some critics focusing on the structure and content of the
disclosures, while others emphasize the ability of consumers to under-
stand the disclosures. 89
Finally, in recent years, an academic discussion has begun as to
whether consumer credit borrowers exhibit various behavioral anomalies
that might explain sub-optimal contracting behavior. Two examples will
illustrate these critiques. First, some scholars have argued that credit
card' 90 users suffer from a combination of behavioral biases that lead
them to underestimate their future borrowing.' 9' The potential impor-
tance of this theory for mandatory disclosure regulation is evident. As
Oren Bar-Gill explains: "Knowledge of credit terms is meaningless, if
the consumer mistakenly believes that she will not borrow."' 192 Disclo-
sure remedies would have to be carefully crafted to overcome such be-
havioral biases. 193
Second, Professor Patricia McCoy has explored the ways in which
lenders target vulnerable borrowers in the predatory, subprime home loan
market.' 94 These lenders identify financially distressed homeowners
(who are neither in the market for credit nor engaging in comparison
shopping) and offer them a seemingly simple way to convert their ex-
isting home equity into cash flow that will ameliorate their financial dif-
ficulties. 195 McCoy argues that lenders in this market frame their sales
pitches to exploit certain predictable behavioral or cognitive anomalies,
making it unlikely the borrowers will fully appreciate the enormous fi-
nancial risk that these transactions pose.196 As with credit cards, the pol-
icy implications are clear-remarkably forceful disclosures would be
188 See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., White & Mansfield, supra note 2, at 238-39 (arguing that, given the structure
of the TILA disclosures, "90 million American adults, more than 50% of the American adult
population, cannot reliably extract the information about contract terms from the TILA disclo-
sure document").
190 A full discussion of credit card pricing and the "stickiness" of credit card interest rates
is beyond the scope of my discussion here. For a recent survey of the literature on that subject,
see Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Credit Card Rates and Consumer Search, 13 REV.
FIN. EcON. 179 (2004).
191 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004); Lawrence
M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J.
249, 261-62 (1997); Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market, 81 AM. EcON. REV. 50, 70-72 (1991). For more optimistic views on consumer ration-
ality in the credit card market, see Dagobert L. Brito & Peter R. Hartley, Consumer Rationality
and Credit Cards, 103 J. POL. ECON. 400 (1995); Zywicki, supra note 184, at 101-10.
192 See Bar-Gill, supra note 191, at 1418.
193 See Bar-Gill, supra note 191, at 1418-19.
194 McCoy, supra note 184.
195 Id. at 91, 93.
196 Id. at 89-94 (discussing loss aversion, reference dependence and framing effects, and
choice heuristics).
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needed to overcome the behavioral biases that these borrowers possess,
or the conduct of the lenders would have to be regulated in such a man-
ner to discourage their exploitation of these behavioral anomalies. 19 7
These critiques of TILA call into question the theoretical validity of the
economic model of disclosure remedies in the consumer finance market.
One who is convinced that the market is not operating efficiently due to
information asymmetries and that consumers are not rationally utilizing
the disclosures to comparison shop for credit might conclude that more
aggressive forms of market regulation are necessary. 198
C. AsSESSING THE CURRENT REGULATORY AND SCHOLARLY CLIMATE
As we have seen, scholars have levied potent theoretical and empiri-
cal critiques against TILA's disclosure regime for over thirty years. A
review of these critiques might inspire a bit of pessimism when it comes
to the efficacy of mandatory disclosure and might lead someone to won-
der whether the quest for effective199 disclosures is futile.2° ° Professor
Rohner captures this perspective:
Nothing in TILA compels consumers to read, understand
and respond to its disclosures. There is no TILA elixir
to cure consumer illiteracy, "innumeracy," or plain dis-
interest. TILA cannot force economic rationality into a
consumer's consciousness. About all that can be ex-
pected is that adequate amounts of credit cost informa-
tion are available, at appropriate times, in a more or less
standardized vocabulary and understandable format, so
that consumers wanting to use it can do so. 20 1
197 Id. at 95-96.
198 For example, Professors McCoy and Engel suggest imposing a "suitability" duty upon
lenders, such as the duty imposed upon securities brokers, which would require subprime lend-
ers to consider the customer's financial status, needs and goals when recommending a loan
product. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1317-59.
199 Assuming that we read "effective" to mean having a direct, substantial effect on con-
sumer transactional behavior.
200 A variant of this view was stated almost 25 years ago, prior to TILA Simplification,
by two preeminent experts, Professors Landers and Rohner, who argued that TILA:
[A]ssumes that consumers will behave differently in their credit transaction if they
are given the best possible TIL disclosure statements. If the desired results have not
been achieved, the argument goes, it is because an adequate set of disclosures has
not yet been designed. But there is every indication that attaining this expressed
purpose is a forlorn hope. Behavioral scientists, public opinion research, consumer
research, and our own common sense tells us the same thing: consumer behavior in a
particular transaction is almost certainly not going to be affected by a TIL disclosure
statement, notwithstanding the quality of that statement.
Landers & Rohner, supra note 34, at 714-15.
201 Rohner, supra note 50, at 114.
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Still, given that disclosure is a relatively recent regulatory develop-
ment,202 some scholars hold out hope that TILA's disclosure regime
could be reformed to achieve its goals by improving the content of the
TILA disclosures and the timing mechanisms of the disclosure regime.
20 3
Thus, the critiques surveyed above might be viewed as the basis for a
legislative reform agenda. For example, the joint Federal Reserve
Board-HUD Report 204 had numerous suggestions for improving TILA
(and RESPA 205), including expanding the definition of APR to include
certain costs that are now excluded206 and revising the timing rules for
mandatory disclosures.20 7  Similarly, scholars have proposed a wide
range of solutions to problems faced by specific consumers, such as Pro-
fessor Bender's calls for more effective disclosures for language minori-
ties.208 Even Professor Rohner, who is less than sanguine about the
direct transactional benefits of disclosures, 2°9 has several put forward
several insightful proposals for reinvigorating TILA's disclosure re-
gime,210 including reducing the statute's at times archaic distinctions be-
tween open and closed-ended credit.2
1
'
Most importantly, members of Congress have not given up on the
concept of disclosure. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
202 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 877-78; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999) ("Mandatory
disclosure was a central part of the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, and it has become
especially prominent in the 1980s and 1990s, largely as an alternative to command-and-control
regulation.").
203 As Professor Christopher Peterson states:
From a long term historical perspective, unlike other American high-cost credit pol-
icy strategies, the disclosure approach is relatively untried. Despite limitations made
apparent over the past thirty-five years, the disclosure approach to preventing harm-
ful social consequences of high-cost credit may yet prove more valuable than other
far older strategies. However, to date, Truth in Lending has not lived up to its poten-
tial. The challenge for consumer advocates is to rhetorically recapture disclosure
law from industry lobbyists. To do so, consumer advocates must recast the goal of
disclosure law as aiming not merely to truthfully describe contracts, but as aiming to
create practical contractual understanding on the part of vulnerable debtors. Any-
thing less risks wasting the historically unique opportunity of credit disclosure law as
yet another demobilizing illusion of debtor protection.
Peterson, supra note 3, at 903; see also id. at 815 ("With aggressive and practical reform,
Truth in Lending may blossom into a much more effective strategy than those which predate it
by hundreds or even thousands of years.").
204 See supra note 137.
205 See FRB/HUD Report, supra note 15. HUD's efforts to reform the RESPA rules are
discussed supra at notes 156-164.
206 Id. at 15-16.
207 Id. at 41-44.
208 See Bender, supra note 16, at 1079-83.
209 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
210 See Rohner, supra note 50, at 119-22.
21t See id. at 120-22.
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Protection Act of 2005212 contains several amendments to TILA's disclo-
sure regime, including enhanced disclosure for open-end credit plans 21 3
and credit extensions secured by a dwelling, 214 and new disclosures for
introductory (teaser) rates 215 and late payment deadlines and penalties. 2t 6
The bill passed the Senate in March 2005217 and soon will be considered
by the House of Representatives, where passage seems assured.
It would be fair to observe, then, that despite the long history of
TILA criticism, some of which casts doubt on the very notion of effec-
tive disclosure, government regulators will continue to rely on disclosure
as an essential method of regulating the consumer credit market. Given
that the reign of disclosure is unlikely to end any time soon, the next
section will provide some suggestions for TILA reform. In particular, it
will address some of the ways in which ongoing TILA reform can be
enriched by interdisciplinary socio-economic theory.
212 See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005). For discussions of earlier versions of this bill, see
Ann Morales Olaztbal & Andrew J. Foti, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform and 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(B): A Case-Based Analysis, 12 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 317 (2003), and Zachary Price, The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LECls. 237
(2002) (discussing the version of the BAPCPA passed by the 107th Congress). The 2003
version of this bill passed by a wide margin in the House of Representatives. see Final Vote for
Roll Call 74, H.R. 975, Mar. 19, 2003, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/
rol1074.xml (vote in the House was 315-113, with one member answering "present" and five
members not voting), but was held up in the Senate over the issue of abortion. Senator Charles
Schumer (D-N.Y.) led an effort to include a provision that would have prevented abortion
protesters from discharging civil judgments by declaring bankruptcy. See Beth Aluise, House
Piggybacks Bankruptcy Reform on Farmers' Aid Bill, CARD NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004; Margaret
Whiteman, Note, F.A.C.E.-ing Up to Bankruptcy Reform: Why a Separate Provision Denying
Discharge of Debts Arising Out of Abortion Clinic Violence Is Redundant, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 395 (2003).
213 See S. 256, BAPCPA § 1301. The following provision is illustrative of the Act's
disclosure approach:
In the case of an open end credit plan that requires a minimum monthly payment of
more than 4 percent of the balance on which finance charges are accruing, the fol-
lowing statement, in a prominent location on the front of the billing statement, dis-
closed clearly and conspicuously: "Minimum Payment Warning: Making only the
required minimum payment will increase the interest you pay and the time it takes to
repay your balance. For example, making only 2% minimum monthly payment on a
balance of $1,000 at an interest rate of 17% would take 88 months to repay the
balance in full. For an estimate of the time it would take to repay your balance,
making only minimum payments, call this toll-free number: ___." (the blank
space to be filled by the creditor).
Id. § 1301(a).
214 Id § 1302.
215 Id. § 1303.
216 Id. § 1305.
217 The vote was 74 in favor to 25 opposed, with one member not voting. See 151 CONG.
REc. S2474 (daily ed. March 10, 2005).
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III. MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
THEORY IN TILA REFORM
A. LAW AND SOCIOECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL
Within the legal academy, socioeconomics 218 is a multidisciplinary
movement dedicated to enriching the study and practice of law through
the application of economics, psychology, sociology, political science,
anthropology, and biology, as well as other academic disciplines.
2 19 The
socioeconomic perspective has at least three core elements: (1) a critique
218 The spellings "socioeconomics" and "socio-economics" are used interchangeably in
the literature.
219 See Robert Ashford, What Is Socioeconomics?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 5 (2004);
Lynne L. Dallas, Teaching Law and Socioeconomics, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 11, 11-12 (2004).
The Association of American Law School's Section on Socio-Economics proffers the follow-
ing answer to the question of "What Is Socio-Economics?":
Socio-economics begins with the assumption that economics is not a self-contained
system, but is embedded in society, polity, culture, and nature. Drawing upon eco-
nomics, sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology, biology and other
social and natural sciences, philosophy, history, law, management, and other disci-
plines, socio-economics regards competitive behavior as a subset of human behavior
within a societal and natural context that both enables and constrains competition
and cooperation. Rather than assume that the individual pursuit of self-interest auto-
matically or generally tends toward an optimal allocation of resources, socio-eco-
nomics assumes that societal sources of order are necessary for people and markets
to function efficiently. Rather than assume that people act only rationally, or that
they pursue only self-interest, socio-economics seeks to advance a more encompass-
ing interdisciplinary understanding of economic behavior open to the assumption
that individual choices are shaped not only by notions of rationality but also by
emotions, social bonds, beliefs, expectations, and a sense of morality.
Socio-economics is both a positive and a normative science. It is dedicated to
the empirical, reality testing approach to knowledge. It respects both inductive and
deductive reasoning. But it also openly recognizes the policy relevance of teaching
and research and seeks to be self-aware of its normative implications rather than
maintaining the mantle of an exclusively positive science. Although it sees ques-
tions of value inextricably connected with individual and group economic choices,
socio-economics does not entail a commitment to any one paradigm or ideological
position, but is open to a range of thinking that treats economic behavior as involv-
ing the whole person and all facets of society within a continually evolving natural
context.
Unique among interdisciplinary approaches, however, socio-economics recog-
nizes the pervasive and powerful influence of the neoclassical paradigm on twentieth
century thought. Recognizing that people first adopt paradigms of thought and then
perform their inductive, deductive, and empirical analyses, socio-economists seek to
examine the assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm, develop a rigorous under-
standing of its limitations, improve upon its application, and develop alternative,
perhaps complementary, approaches that are predictive, exemplary, and morally
sound. With modest amendment, this description of socio-economics was the sub-
stance of the petition signed by more than one hundred twenty law professors from
over fifty AALS member schools, to establish the AALS Section on Socio-Econom-
ics. It serves as the constitution of the Section.
AALS SEC. ON SocIo-EcoN. NEWSL., No. 19, at 4 (November-December 2003), available at
http://www.journaloflawandsocioeconomics.com (last viewed June 30, 2004).
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of the law and neoclassical economics approach, especially its assump-
tions regarding rationality; 220 (2) a recognition that law and legal deci-
sion-making both reflect and affect the distribution of wealth, power, and
well-being in our society and that these effects have normative signifi-
cance; 221 and (3) an endorsement of empirical legal research,222 in part to
create a body of evidence that can be used to challenge or refine neoclas-
sical economic assumptions regarding the marketplace. Given these core
elements, socioeconomics might be viewed as a liberal or progressive
alternative to the traditional law and economics movement, which is
often seen (correctly or not) as a sub-discipline captured by those who
operate from conservative or libertarian perspectives. 223 Socio-econo-
mists notably assert that the discipline does not require the adoption of
any particular economic or political ideology, 224 though healthy respect
for the scientific method is a prerequisite to practicing
socioeconomics. 225
The persuasive socioeconomic entreaty to eschew unpersuasive
neoclassical assumptions regarding human rationality is not, of course,
unique within legal scholarship. Building upon Herbert Simon's ground-
220 See Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 Wis.
L. REv. 611, 612 ("Socio-economics begins with the assumption that an adequate understand-
ing of economic behavior cannot be achieved by the assumptions of autonomy, rationality, and
efficiency that stand at the epistemological foundation of neoclassical economics and rational
choice theory."); Ashford, supra note 219, at 6-7; Lynne L. Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics
in Legal Education, 55 RUrTGERS L. REV. 855 (2003); Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House:
Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Law and Economics Curricula,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 49 (2004); see also Dallas, supra note 219, at 16-18; AALS SEC.
ON Soclo-EcON. NEWSL., supra note 219, at 4.
221 See Ashford, supra note 219, at 9; Dallas, supra note 219, at 19-20. Jeffrey Harrison
points out that socioeconomics cannot provide an answer to what is "just," but it can reveal the
limitations of a purely economic approach to such questions. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and
Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 225-30 (1999).
222 See Ashford, supra note 220, at 613; Margaret F. Brinig, The Role of Socioeconomics
in Teaching Family Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 178 (2004).
223 William K. Black, The Imperium Strikes Back: The Need to Teach Socioeconomics to
Law Students, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 236-37 (2004).
224 See Ashford, supra note 219, at 7; Harrison, supra note 221, at 235 (noting that a
challenge to the field is resisting capture by "true believers of one kind or another"); AALS
SEC. ON Socio-EcoN. NEWSL., supra note 219, at 4 ( "Although it sees questions of value
inextricably connected with individual and group economic choices, socio-economics does not
entail a commitment to any one paradigm or ideological position ... ").
225 See Ashford, supra note 219, at 8; Robert Ashford, What Is the "New" Corporate
Social Responsibility? The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1187, 1195 (2002); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Socioeconomics:
Choices and Challenges, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 257, 265-66 (2004).
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breaking work 226 on "bounded rationality,' 227 scholars have addressed
whether there are discernable or predictable patterns to decision-mak-
ing, 228 and whether, when, and how legal rulemaking should respond to
these patterns.229 This scholarly trend is reflected in the extraordinary
growth of the field of behavioral law and economics, 230 which shares
with socioeconomics a deep skepticism of the predictive power of neo-
classical economic assumptions. 231
B. SOCIOECONOMICS AND TILA
This section will attempt to illustrate the value that socioeconomics
can add to TLA reform. By exploring one source of contention between
progressive critics and defenders of the neoclassical economic model of
consumer credit shopping, I will seek to demonstrate the value of using
empirical study in the design of consumer credit regulations.
226 See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (2nd ed. 1982) [hereinafter SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALrrY];
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955) [herein-
after Simon, A Behavioral Model].
227 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 3 n. 1 (2002) ("According to the theory of bounded rationality, economic actors seek to
maximize their expected utility, but the limitations of human cognition often result in decisions
that fail to maximize utility. Decisionmakers inherently have limited memories, computational
skills, and other mental tools, which in turn limit their ability to gather and process
information.").
228 For discussions in the area of consumer decision-making, see James R. Bettman et al.,
Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 187 (1998); Paredes,
supra note 1, at 434-43.
229 See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1765-73 (2003) (assessing the current state of legal
decision theory).
230 See Prentice, supra note 229, at 1667 n.10 (collecting sources); see also Russell B.
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CI.
L. REV. 1203, 1218-44 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judg-
ment and Decision-Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499
(1998); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002);
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the
New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002); Symposium, The
Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998).
231 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 27, at 1074-75 ("The goal of the law-and-behav-
ioral-science movement is not ... to replace rational choice theory with an inconsistent para-
digm but to modify the implausible elements of rational choice theory and supplement the
inadequate elements in order to create a tool with more predictive power in specific situa-
tions."); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behav-
ioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 973, 979 ("The ambition of
advocates of the new law and behavioral science model is to develop an approach to legal
questions that integrates findings from cognitive and social psychology ... into an economic
framework in order to yield an approach with greater descriptive accuracy and predictive
reliability.").
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1. Progressive, Market-Specific Concerns Underlying TILA
Critiques
As we saw earlier, many of the critiques of TILA raise global ques-
tions about the efficacy of regulating through disclosure. 232 Despite the
potential wide reach of such criticisms, much of the progressive, critical
scholarship in the field, upon close examination, is quite context-specific
in its orientation. Scholars often argue that TILA disclosure is unlikely
to succeed as a market perfecting mechanism in the particular market for
consumer credit being studied. This prudent approach leaves open the
possibility that improved disclosures might be an effective remedy in
another part of the market. 233 Moreover, adopting this intellectually cau-
tious stance avoids the need to support the extreme argument that
mandatory disclosure is doomed to failure as a regulatory tool in all cir-
cumstances-an argument that few scholars would want to champion.
Thus, Professors Engel and McCoy, in a penetrating article on mort-
gage lending, focus on the predatory market for home mortgages, rather
than the prime or legitimate subprime markets. 234 This qualification later
ties in to their conclusion that disclosure alone will not be a sufficient
remedy in that market. 235 Other scholars likewise have limited the full
force of their critiques to carefully delineated segments of the subprime
consumer credit market, 236 leaving open the theoretical possibility that
disclosure might be sufficient to regulate aspects of the prime or legiti-
mate subprime markets.237 For example, Lynn Drysdale and Kathleen
Keest focus on the "payday loans, refund anticipation loans, pawns and
title pawns for cash advances, and rent-to-own products for retail
232 See, e.g., White & Mansfield, supra note 1, at 261 (expressing general skepticism over
ability of disclosure to solve information asymmetry problems).
233 Bender, supra note 16, at 1 C77 ("The extent of the inability to correct the particular
market failure through disclosure should be weighed against the degree of infringement that
market control places on the consumer's freedom of contractual choice. Therefore, the appro-
priate choice may vary for different consumer transactions.").
234 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1261, 1279.
235 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1309 ("[M]ost victims of predatory lending
already find current disclosures incomprehensible. For nafve borrowers, piling on more dis-
closures will not help .... More disclosure would simply compound the confusion that cur-
rently exists.").
236 Cecil J. Hunt, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory
Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 286 (2003)("In the subprime market, and especially the predatory extremes of that market, the borrowers
generally have neither the financial sophistication to meaningfully understand the disclosures
or the market power to use them as a basis to comparison shop.").
237 See id. ("While such disclosures undoubtedly can make a significant difference in the
prime market where borrowers are sufficiently sophisticated to meaningfully understand them
and possess enough market power to shop around for the best comparison deal, the same is not
true in the subprime market.").
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sale, ' 238 which are part of a so-called "fringe banking marketplace" most
often utilized by those who are financially below the middle-class. 239
Moreover, Christopher Peterson, in his comprehensive historical account
of consumer credit regulation, takes great care to emphasize that his tar-
get for reform is information distortion in the "high-cost credit" market
that serves vulnerable debtors. 240 In sum, it is fair to state that an under-
lying theme of TILA criticism is the inability of disclosure to protect
economically disadvantaged and disenfranchised consumers within cer-
tain segments of the consumer credit market.241 Although this concern
has been reinvigorated with recent attention to the problem of predatory
lending, it has been a major issue with TILA since its inception. The
earliest Truth in Lending literature focused on the poor and was charac-
terized by scholarly skepticism regarding whether disclosure could solve
the social or financial ills faced by disenfranchised consumers.2 42 This
progressive theme highlights the situation-specific nature of TILA criti-
ques and will be an important factor to keep in mind, as the discussion
proceeds to the ways in which socioeconomics can clarify the debate
over disclosure.
238 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 595; see also id. at 661 ("[M]arket forces work
better in some parts of the consumer credit marketplace than in others. But the basic threshold
question must always be whether the particular marketplace under scrutiny is one in which
market forces work well, and the fringe market raises serious questions in this regard.").
239 See id. at 626-27 ("[Tihe broad outlines suggest that, while some middle class con-
sumers may turn to the fringe banking system for convenience or because of temporary set-
backs, the primary target market for the fringe banking system is one in which market forces
may not work well.").
240 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 890-902 ("Unfortunately there are strong indications
that, at least in the market for high-cost credit, Truth in Lending has failed almost entirely in
promoting price informed borrowing decisions among the most vulnerable debtors. In the
high-cost credit market, structural and market forces act, not to promote price competition, but
to promote confusion and strategic lending behavior.") (emphasis added).
241 Engel and McCoy decline to make race, gender, income, or class a necessary defini-
tional element of "predatory lending." See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1260 n.7
("[P]redatory lenders target vulnerable consumers for financial exploitation, often because of
their race, gender, income, or class .... However, predatory loans can occur in the absence of
such targeting, so we do not include it as a defining feature.") (internal cross-citation omitted).
Nevertheless, they do observe that lenders engage in a variety of tactics to target vulnerable
consumers. See id. at 1280-86; see also Renuart, supra note 130, at 430.
242 See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967); John M.
Drain, Jr., Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 89, 111 -
14 (1970); Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 11-13 (1969); Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 441, 449 (1967) ("The existing scheme of consumer-credit laws-
although well-intended and carefully devised-is vulnerable to the criticism that it supplies
largely middle-class solutions (e.g., rate ceilings, disclosure) to what has increasingly become
a lower class problem."); see also Kofele-Kale, supra note 46, at 142-46; Hynes & Posner,
supra note 6. at 194.
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2. The Neo-Classical Response: The Informed Minority
Argument
A progressive skeptic might conclude that price inefficiency is inev-
itable if most consumers are not actually comparison shopping for credit,
even if we assume (however implausible this might seem) that there is
full price transparency 243 and an absence of search costs. Neoclassical
economics, however, suggests that it is not necessary for all or nearly all
of the consumers to comparison shop for the market to be efficient or
competitive. 244 This is the "informed minority" argument. Ted Cruz and
Jeffrey J. Hinck explain: "Simply stated, the informed minority argument
is that if a sufficient number of buyers are well-informed regarding the
price and quality of a product, then it will behoove the seller to sell the
efficient quality product at the competitive price to all buyers. '245 Under
this view, well-informed consumers can "police the market"246 if (and
this is a big "if') creditors have no sufficiently inexpensive method for
discriminating between informed and uninformed consumers.2 47 As
Schwartz and Wilde explain:
The presence of at least some consumer search in a mar-
ket creates the possibility of a "pecuniary externality":
persons who search sometimes protect nonsearchers
from overreaching firms. This result can obtain because
in mass transactions it is usually too expensive for firms
to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and non-
searchers. . . . Thus, if enough searchers exist, firms
have incentives both to compete for their business and to
offer the same terms to nonsearchers. When the prefer-
243 This may not be the case in the subprime mortgage market. See Alan M. White, Risk-
Based Mortgage Pricing-Present and Future Research, 15 Housing Policy Debate 503, 509
(2004) ("[C]urrent subprime mortgage rates at the retail level are secret.").
244 See Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 172-73; Lee & Hogarth, supra note 26, at 74
(discussing Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosures
in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Consumers, Working Paper, Kellogg Graduate
School of Management, Northwestern University (1997)); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 28,
at 638 (footnotes omitted).
245 R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an In-
formed Minority to Correct for Inperfect Information, 47 HASTtNGS L.J. 635, 646 (1996); see
also Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach Contracts and What Socioeconomics Can
Do About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55, 70 (2004) ("It is ... well accepted among economists
that shopping behavior by a relatively small proportion of consumers is sufficient to create a
competitive market.") (citing George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347 (1981)).
246 Brandt & Day, supra note 79, at 327 ("Although most consumers are still generally
uninformed about credit terms, current awareness levels may be sufficient to 'police the mar-
ket' in the sense of acting as a price-sensitive segment that is large enough to encourage viable
competition on the basis of the APR.").
247 See Hynes & Posner, supra note 6, at 173.
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ences of searchers are positively correlated with the pref-
erences of nonsearchers, competition among firms for
searchers should tend to protect all consumers. 248
Like most elegant economic theories, the informed minority argu-
ment has been subjected to criticism from scholars who question its
premises. 249 Three critiques are particularly trenchant. First, scholars
question whether a sufficient number of consumers will engage in
searching activity to achieve the pecuniary externality described by
Schwartz and Wilde.250 Second, assuming a large enough informed mi-
nority exists, scholars doubt whether the interests of these marginal con-
sumers25' always are aligned with the interests of average consumers
whose interests they are supposed to protect.252 Third, critics claim that
sellers are, in fact, able to and do distinguish between informed and unin-
formed 25 3 consumers 254 and thus are able to offer less attractive terms to
uninformed consumers without risking the loss of marginal consumers.
3. Socioeconomics and the Future of TILA
The debate over the informed minority argument has practical im-
plications for TILA reform because it highlights how the socioeconomic
approach can enrich the standard law and economics approach that un-
derlies the Act's disclosure mechanisms. On one side of the debate are
critics and commentators who are particularly concerned with the mar-
ket's ability to protect the interests of disadvantaged, marginalized con-
sumers of credit. Such critics not only doubt the ability of the
marketplace to provide just or fair results, but also are skeptical of the
ability of government-mandated disclosures, such as those compelled by
TILA, to remedy market failures. In opposition are theorists who see the
promise (perhaps unfulfilled) of disclosure as a market-perfecting device,
buttressed by the informed minority argument-the contention that shop-
248 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 28, at 638 (footnotes omitted).
249 See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 245; Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Con-
tract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MAMI L. REV. 1263,
1270-71 (1993) ("Despite wishful commentary to the contrary, there is no evidence that a
small cadre of type-A consumers ferrets out the most beneficial subordinate contract terms,
permitting the market to protect the vast majority of consumers.").
250 See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 245, at 664-69; Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 243-44.
251 See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 245, at 669-70 (describing marginal consumers as those
who are willing to leave the market if they do not get their terms).
252 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 683, 776 (1993); Cruz & Hinck, supra note 245, at
670-72; Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behav-
ioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337. 383-84.
253 Some consumers may be informed but searching on terms other than the APR. See
supra note 184.
254 See Croley & Hanson, supra note 252, at 776; Cruz & Hinck, supra note 245, at 672-
75; McCoy, supra note 184, at 91; Prentice, supra note 252, at 383-84.
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ping by a subset of all consumers can create market efficiency for non-
shopping consumers.
Socioeconomics can either help resolve the impasse or, at the very
least, clarify the precise nature of the discord between these two camps.
In this case, we begin with the understanding that there is much agree-
ment between the neoclassical economic approach, with its reliance on
the informed minority argument, and the skeptical, progressive view-
point: Both sides agree that there are conditions under which disclosure
is sufficient to enable an informed minority to assist in the market perfec-
tion process. The ultimate question is whether these necessary condi-
tions are present in a particular segment of the market. Thus, the dispute
between the two groups is best seen not as a theoretical, ideological, or
normative divide, but rather as an empirical conflict that can be resolved
or illuminated through interdisciplinary study of the consumer credit
market. 255
Socioeconomics directs us to question the neoclassical model by
empirically testing our assumptions regarding consumer behavior. It
thus demands that the existence and actions of the informed minority and
the creditors' responses be proven rather than assumed. This leads to
three propositions or scholarly challenges. First, it is insufficient for ad-
herents of the neoclassical model to assert baldly that an informed minor-
ity will protect the interests of all shoppers. Regulators must require
some demonstration of the existence of a sufficiently large informed mi-
nority who share the preferences of non-searchers within a particular
market. If such a minority exists, we then need to establish whether
creditors discriminate between classes of shoppers within this market.
Second, by the same token, progressive critics must empirically
challenge the informed minority argument head-on. The neoclassical ec-
onomic model cannot be dismissed simply by noting the existence of
information asymmetries within the consumer credit market based upon
TILA's flawed disclosure regime or the cognitive or behavioral failings
of consumers. Such claims imply, intentionally or not, that large num-
bers of consumers must be informed to guarantee market efficiency.
There may be contexts in which this is true, but it cannot be assumed; the
sufficiency of an informed minority must be demonstrated in the particu-
lar segment of the consumer credit market at issue. Thus, progressive
critics must determine empirically why the informed minority is unlikely
to function and facilitate market efficiency in the particular segment of
the consumer market being studied. Evidence from other markets, while
255 See Rubin, supra note 245, at 70 ("[I]t is...well accepted among economists that
shopping behavior by a relatively small proportion of consumers is sufficient to create a com-
petitive market. The question is whether such shopping behavior occurs and whether firms
respond to it.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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valuable, is insufficient because each market operates differently.2 56
Similarly, one cannot presume creditors have the ability to differentiate
between informed and uninformed shoppers; empirical proof of creditor
conduct can move us past anecdotal or intuitions about such sorting.
Building upon this socioeconomic approach, if disclosure is not de-
monstrably futile, any conclusions regarding the efficacy of existing or
proposed disclosures should take into account the reality of how consum-
ers process and use the information contained in these disclosures.2 57
The information overload debate suggests that more disclosure is not al-
ways better.2 58 Further study of the consumer credit market, 259 however,
will enable regulators to move past such simple bromides and endeavor
to design more effective consumer credit disclosures. As regulators pro-
ceed, they must remain cognizant of the possibility that an informed mi-
nority can police the market. To be the most effective, the design of
disclosures must take into account not only consumer decision-making at
a general level, but it must also reflect an understanding that different
disclosures may be required for different audiences. For example, in se-
curities regulation, various experts play a role analogous to the informed
minority in (arguably) keeping the securities markets efficient. 260 The
256 For example, a cautious critic would note that some of the criticisms of the informed
minority argument I previously reviewed (see supra Part III.B.2) arose in response to the
argument that an informed minority could generate efficient terms in form contracts and war-
ranties. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 252, at 776; Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 240-45;
Meyerson, supra note 249, at 1270-71. These criticisms do not necessarily apply to the price
term in consumer credit contracts, which is conceded even by the critics of the informed mi-
nority argument. See Meyerson, supra note 249, at 1271 ("Obvious terms, such as pricing and
warranties, may be subject to such comparison shopping. It is hard, however, to imagine a
sufficient number of prospective consumers refusing to rent a car because the contract contains
an unfair forum selection clause."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Form Contract: Law
and Economics Meet the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 601 (1990) (drawing a distinction
between shopping for subordinate contract terms and shopping for price).
257 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an
Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REv. 697, 672 n.285 (2001) (citing Eisenberg, supra note
135, at 244 (noting that the argument regarding the efficiency of form contract disclaimers or
risk-shifting provisions "depends on how many people actually read form contracts, which is
an empirical question, and there is disagreement that enough actually do" and "very little
empirical data available on the question")); cf Rubin, supra note 245, at 70 ("[C]onsumer
behavior regarding form contracts is an empirical question and a question that lends itself to
psychological and sociological analysis.").
258 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
259 There have been some scholarly efforts to move past anecdotal evidence towards a
richer, more comprehensive account of certain segments of the consumer credit market. See,
e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 9 (addressing predatory mortgage market). Additional em-
pirical studies would undoubtedly enrich such scholarship.
260 See Paredes, supra note 1, at 432 ("As a practical matter, a company's disclosures are
largely 'filtered' through experts-various securities professionals and financial in-
termediaries-who research and process the information and whose trades and recommenda-
tions ultimately set securities prices."); Schwarcz, supra note I, at 17-18 ("[N]ot all investors
need to understand any given disclosure. The explanation for how markets can assimilate new
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market for securities information, however, is not homogeneous, thereby
requiring different required disclosures in different contexts. As Profes-
sors Michael Fishman and Kathleen Hagerty point out, the disclosure
requirements for hedge funds are less onerous than those for mutual
funds because hedge funds are only open to a class of wealthy investors
who are presumed to be sophisticated. 261 Thus, conclusions regarding an
informed minority or necessary disclosures might differ across the mar-
kets for home mortgages, credit cards, and automobile loans, as well as
in forms of high-cost consumer credit. 262
A few final points regarding the socioeconomic approach are in or-
der. First, none of the foregoing discussion means that there will not be
cases where disclosure is futile and more substantive regulation of the
market is warranted. But, as critics of disclosure are aware, there are
significant political challenges that face those who seek such substantive
regulation of the consumer credit market. The socioeconomic approach
will help critics articulate why disclosure is futile in a particular context
(if the conclusion is empirically warranted), or if substantive regulation
is unlikely to emerge the socioeconomic approach can at least help us to
design more effective disclosures.
Second, the socioeconomic approach suggests the need for even
more empirical research of the consumer credit market. 263 Such calls
within the legal academy are problematic for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing questions regarding the competence of some law professors to gener-
information so rapidly stems from the existence of a large number of sophisticated market
investors who trade for their own account or for the investors they represent.").
261 See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclo-
sure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORGAN.
45, 59 (2003). I do not mean to suggest that regulators have arrived at optimal disclosure
design solutions based upon empirical study of the securities markets. This is simply cited as
an example of the wisdom of tailoring disclosure solutions to the particular informational
context at hand. It may very well be that similar empirical study is warranted in the area of
securities. See Paredes, supra note 1, at 473-74. In addition, it should be noted that the SEC is
in the process of expanding its regulation of hedge funds. See Deborah Solomon, SEC Push-
ing Proposal to Regulate Hedge Funds-Donaldson Is Set on July 14 to Defy Critics with Call
for Registration of Advisers, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at C4.
262 See supra notes 3 and 8 and accompanying text (discussing literature on forms of
high-cost credit). TILA does mandate some additional disclosures for different areas of the
consumer credit market. See supra notes 11, 15-17, 41, and 69 and accompanying text. The
design of these disclosures, however, is not the product of the type of socioeconomic study or
reflection described in this article, and there has been no effort to empirically demonstrate that
the additional disclosures serve their intended functions.
263 In the scholarly literature, one still sees reliance on studies from the early 1970's
regarding consumer credit shopping behavior. This is understandable given the lack of empiri-
cal work in the field, but should concern scholars and regulators because these studies were
produced before TILA's effects could be fully realized in the marketplace, and they pre-date
massive changes in the U.S. consumer credit market in the past 30 years such the dramatic
expansion of credit card usage. See Durkin, supra note 175.
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ate this research 264 and skepticism regarding the limits of using social
science findings in lawmaking. 265 Nevertheless, these doubts counsel
only caution, not the abandonment of an empirically enlightened ap-
proach. A more serious problem with empirical study of consumer credit
is the ability of legal scholars and other independent critics to obtain the
necessary data at an affordable cost. 266 This problem is magnified if the
most relevant data is held by industry members or their surrogates, and,
for whatever reasons, they are unwilling to share this information with
academics that wish to study financial services industry practices. 267
Third, none of the prior discussion excludes someone with a socio-
economic bent from moving beyond empirical inquiries into the validity
of the informed minority argument. I selected that context as a way to
illustrate the value of socioeconomics, 268 but of course, there may be
many other barriers to market or price efficiency that warrant empirical
study. 269 Moreover, it would be fascinating to move beyond empirical,
market efficiency critiques into a broader normative analysis of con-
sumer credit regulation. For example, a socioeconomic critic could criti-
cize the outcomes of TILA's regulatory regime based on political or
philosophical goals other than market efficiency. A rigorous moral eval-
uation of the consumer credit market would certainly be of value in addi-
tion to the socioeconomic method discussed here.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that there are some encouraging
governmental developments that could conceivably dovetail with the so-
cioeconomic approach described above. First, Congress recently passed
the Financial Literacy and Education Improvement Act, 270 which created
the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, whose goal is to im-
prove "the financial literacy and education of persons in the United
States through development of a national strategy to promote financial
literacy and education. '' 27' Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the Com-
mission is working on initiatives including the creation of a toll-free fi-
264 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (2002);
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Deci-
sion Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819; Michael Heise, The Impor-
tance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of
Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002).
265 See Rostain, supra note 231, at 1000-03.
266 See Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in
Shaping the Law, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1, 26-30 (discussing empirical data at issue in bankruptcy
reform debate). Professor Patricia McCoy drew my attention to this issue.
267 Id.
268 Recall that my discussion of the informed minority argument began with several sim-
plifying assumptions. See supra Part III.B.2.
269 See generally Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing-Present and Future Re-
search, 15 Housing Policy Debate 503 (2004).
270 Pub. L. 108-159, §§ 511-519 (2003).
271 Id. at § 513(b).
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nancial education hotline number and a financial education website.
These initiatives indirectly reinforce the vitality of disclosure because
informed and educated consumers are a necessary part of any market-
perfection solutions. The Commission's members include twenty high-
ranking government officials with a common interest in stimulating fi-
nancial literacy and supporting financial education.272 This makes it an
ideal body to encourage the type of socioeconomic research needed to
improve both TILA scholarship and the mandatory disclosure system. In
fact, the statute mandates the generation of a study and report of financial
literacy.2 73
Second, as part of the pending Bankruptcy Reform Act,27 4 Congress
directed the Federal Reserve Board to conduct two separate studies, the
first regarding consumer understanding of financial disclosures and con-
sumer understanding of credit arrangements, 275 and the second on the
bankruptcy impact of credit extended to dependent students.276 The
study of financial literacy and consumer understanding of credit arrange-
ments can be an essential start to the socioeconomic process of rethink-
ing the structure and design of TILA's mandatory disclosure regime.
CONCLUSION
During the past 35 years, scholars and commentators have argued
that the Truth in Lending Act's mandatory disclosure regime has neither
eliminated information asymmetries in the consumer credit market, nor
promoted informed credit shopping. Critics argue that the disclosure re-
gime is ineffective either because the disclosures are somehow flawed or
because consumers are unwilling or unable, for a variety of cognitive and
272 See id. § 513(c) (setting forth composition of Commission); § 513(d) (designating the
Secretary of the Treasury as the Commission Chairperson). According to a Department of the
Treasury press release, the Commission currently includes the Secretary of the Treasury and
the heads of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Office of Thrift Supervision;
the Federal Reserve; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Credit Union
Administration; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Departments of Education, Ag-
riculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and
Veterans Affairs; the Federal Trade Commission; the General Services Administration; the
Small Business Administration; the Social Security Administration; the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission; and the Office of Personnel Management. Press Release, Department of
Treasury Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Deputy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman Opens Sec-
ond Meeting of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, May 20, 2004, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl688.htm (last visited July 7, 2004).
273 See Pub. L. 108-159, § 517 (2003) ("The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct a study to assess the extent of consumers' knowledge and awareness of credit
reports, credit scores, and the dispute resolution process, and on methods for improving finan-
cial literacy among consumers.").
274 See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
275 See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
§ 1301(c), 109th Cong. (2005).
276 Id. § 1308.
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behavioral reasons, to utilize the disclosures to maximize their self-inter-
est as neoclassical economics would predict. These criticisms have led
to deep skepticism over the sufficiency of disclosure as a means to regu-
late the consumer credit market, especially with regard to protecting fi-
nancially disenfranchised consumers.
Nevertheless, legislators have not lost faith, and mandatory disclo-
sure will continue to be an essential part of any regulatory scheme.
Given this reality, scholars who seek to criticize, defend, or improve the
TILA regime should be prepared to address the core assumptions of the
neoclassical economic model on which TILA is based. Socioeconomics,
a multidisciplinary, critical approach to legal practice, can enrich this
process by challenging standard economic assumptions regarding con-
sumer rationality and encouraging scholars to test empirically their as-
sumptions regarding consumer credit shopping behavior. This article
illustrated this point by showing how socioeconomics could force both
defenders and detractors of mandatory disclosure to confront the "in-
formed minority" argument-the claim that shopping by a segment of
consumers can inure to the benefit of all consumers within a particular
market.
By following a socioeconomic approach, commentators on
mandatory disclosure can help create a comprehensive, empirical under-
standing of the consumer credit market that will have two major benefits.
First, legislators and regulators will have a more systematic method for
determining which segments of the consumer credit market are most
amenable to regulation through disclosure. Second, proponents of addi-
tional or different mandatory disclosures will have an empirically sound
basis for determining whether the design of these disclosures is optimal
and likely to affect consumer-shopping behavior in the desired manner.
The regulation of the consumer credit market through mandatory disclo-
sure laws such as the Truth in Lending Act is a central feature of the U.S.
regulatory landscape. Both proponents and critics of such market-
perfecting regulation will benefit from a socioeconomic turn in T1LA
scholarship. Such a path will enrich scholarship on both sides, improve
proposed changes to the regime, and may even provoke a deeper discus-
sion over the contexts in which disclosure is likely to serve our social
goals, which in turn could lead to more debate over the precise nature of
the goals of disclosure.
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